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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation project examines the effect of various state regulations such as 
Certificate-of-Need (CON) regulation, uncompensated care pools and community benefit 
requirement laws on hospital provision of uncompensated care and analyzes both for-
profit and non-profit hospitals’ responsiveness to the regulatory environment. The 
analysis of these regulations uses panel data econometric methods for a sample of 
hospitals in 17 states from 2002 to 2004.  This study overcomes the limits of previous 
research that focused primarily on the effect of a single regulation in a given state. It uses 
three estimation methods: pooled Ordinary Least Squares (pooled OLS), random effects 
generalized least squares (GLS) and Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) to 
obtain the parameter estimates. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method, we interpret results based on the cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV 
estimates.  Findings suggest that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to some policy 
instruments similarly and others differently. For example, both nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals respond to CON laws by increasing their uncompensated care provision. 
However, they respond to policy incentives such as community benefit requirement laws 
differently. Furthermore, regulatory interactions are found to significantly influence the 
uncompensated care provision by both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The dissertation 
helps policy makers formulate strategies to create incentives to enhance access to care for 
the economically disadvantaged. For example, implementing CON and providing public 
subsidies at the same time may offer better access to care for the uninsured than 
 xiii
implementing either regulation alone. However, community benefit requirement laws do 
not appear to expand the amount of uncompensated care provided by nonprofit hospitals.  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A continued decline in the share of the population with health insurance coverage 
combined with movement to decreased reimbursement for hospitals have caused renewed 
concern about access to health care for the underinsured and uninsured. Hospital 
uncompensated care, a primary source of care for the indigent, has been declining even 
though the demand for such care continues to grow. According to a Census Bureau report, 
the number of uninsured has risen considerably over the years. In less than a decade, the 
percentage of people without health insurance coverage rose from 14.2 percent in 2000 to 
15.8 percent in 2006, that is, 47 million people (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor et al. 2006; 
Census 2008). This trend has resulted in substantial stress for public and nonprofit 
teaching hospitals that have played a central role in providing access to care for the 
indigent. American Hospital Association (AHA) statistics show that hospitals provided 
almost $29 billion in uncompensated care in 2005, which comprised about six percent of 
U.S. acute care hospitals’ revenue (AHA 2006). In the face of growing fiscal pressures, 
this burden has started to jeopardize the financial solvency of some hospitals, and has 
consequently exerted significant impact on access to care for those who need it the most.  
Because state regulatory policies have greatly influenced the level of 
uncompensated care and the ability of hospitals to finance such care, this study examines 
the impact of such policies on hospital provision of uncompensated care and analyzes 
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hospitals’ relative responsiveness to the regulatory environment*. Specifically, the study 
will seek to answer the following research questions: (1) How do regulatory 
environments affect hospitals that differ by type of ownership?  (2) Do regulatory 
interactions make individual regulations more or less effective?   
Answers to these research questions are important because they will help policy 
makers formulate strategies to improve hospital financing of uncompensated care and 
create incentives to enhance access to care for the uninsured. For instance, in light of the 
recent debate over the new Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling requiring nonprofit 
hospitals to report community benefits, it is crucial for the policy makers to understand 
the intended or unintended consequences of the existing state community benefit 
requirement laws and whether they influence other similar regulations. In addition, 
alternative interventions might be developed to protect the safety net hospitals†, which 
are often the last resort for care for the uninsured and underinsured, by redistributing the 
burden of uncompensated care to financially relieve these providers. Furthermore, if 
regulations are jointly effective in increasing hospital provision of uncompensated care, 
policy makers targeting at expanding access to care for the uninsured should consider 
designing more complex regulatory strategies. If interaction among regulations reduces 
the effectiveness of an individual regulation, the existing regulatory environment should 
                                                 
 
 
* Note that we are not including federal regulations in the current study due to a lack of variation across 
states. Our main interest lies in state’s regulatory variations. 
† These are hospitals, either public or private, that have a legal obligation or a commitment to provide direct 
health care services to the uninsured or underinsured Dalton, et al. (2005). "Survival strategies for 
Michigan's health care safety net providers." Health Serv Res 40(3): 923-40..  
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be carefully examined when new regulations are designed.  Thus, the investigation of 
multiple regulations is crucial to policy design (Antel, Ohsfeldt and Becker, 1995).  
We adopt panel data econometric methods for a sample of 2,235 nonprofit and 
295 for-profit hospitals in 17 states from 2002 to 2004.  This study uses a comprehensive 
dataset that includes information obtained from three major data sources: the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey of hospitals, the Area Resource File (ARF) 
and the State Inpatient Database (SID) of the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP).  It 
overcomes the limits of previous research that focused primarily on the effect of a single 
regulation in a given state. It uses three estimation methods: pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (pooled OLS), random effects generalized least squares (GLS) and Hausman 
Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) to obtain the parameter estimates. Weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method, we interpret results based on the cross-
validation of the GLS and HTIV estimates.   
Our findings suggest that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to some 
policy instruments similarly and others differently.  In addition, we find significant 
regulatory interactions. Sometimes the effect of a regulation bundle differs from that of 
individual regulations.  This result indicates that previous studies that failed to include 
regulatory interactions tend to overestimate or misestimate the effect of single regulations. 
Some important limitations need to be noted. Due to data unavailability, we do not have 
real changes over time for some key variables that the HTIV model uses to construct 
robust internal instruments. Additionally, our population adjustment of these variables, 
though introducing within group variation, creates measurement errors that could bias our 
estimates. Future research should focus on obtaining more data on these variables so that 
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we could improve the HTIV estimations. Enhanced measures of regulatory intensity 
using data that include information on primary/preventive care should also be used 
improve our understanding of the mechanism by which these regulations affect hospital 
uncompensated care provision.  
 5
Scope of the Research 
In the current research, we focus on nonfederal, short-term general medical and 
surgical hospitals. We exclude nursing homes, hospices, and home health care agencies 
because they compete in a different market and are typically treated separately. We 
further exclude federal hospitals for similar reasons.  
 We focus on differences in state regulatory environments for three reasons. First 
and foremost, states are playing an increasingly significant role in regulating their 
marketplaces. With the recent shifts toward a more state-centered form of federalism, 
states have been encouraged to formulate and implement their own regulations to reflect 
regional dynamics (Turnock and Atchison 2002). Second, failure to recognize regulatory 
variations among states would lead to an incomplete understanding of regulation’s impact 
on organizational behaviors (Anderson, Heyssel et al. 1993). Third, states have always 
been an ideal laboratory for “natural experiments”. With the variation in the regulatory 
environment among states, we are able to test theoretical models in a more scientific and 
rigorous fashion, using a near-natural experiment approach (i.e., comparisons of 
outcomes under different regulatory environments).  To capture a state’s regulatory 
environment, we include in our analysis a much broader scope of regulations than many 
existing studies. These regulations include Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws, Any-
Willing-Provider (AWP) or Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) regulation, rate-
setting/uncompensated care pool regulation, state hospital conversion regulation, and 
community benefit mandates.‡ 
                                                 
 
 
‡ Due to a lack of variations on AWP/FOC and state hospital conversion regulations in our data sample, we 
do not empirically test the impact of these two regulations.   
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Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two first reviews literature on 
hospital regulation and behavior, as well as hospital provision of uncompensated care. It 
then summarizes the empirical studies and identifies gaps in the research.   
Chapter Three discusses theoretical models of hospital behavior and 
uncompensated care provision. The first section develops models of hospital behaviors in 
response to exogenous changes. The next section presents hypotheses to be tested.  
Chapter Four presents the methodology, empirical model, and data to be used in 
the analysis. Chapter Five describes the estimation methodology and presents findings, 
while Chapter Six concludes, discusses policy implications and study limitations, and 
suggests directions for future research.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Previous literature analyzing regulation’s impact on uncompensated care 
provision largely emphasizes the effect of a single regulation without much focus on 
sectoral differences or policy interactions. This chapter first reviews literature on 
uncompensated care trends. It then explores motivations for government intervention and 
the regulation of the hospital industry. This chapter then describes the specific regulations 
under investigation and reviews relevant empirical studies. It concludes with a summary 
of the literature and an evaluation of the gaps in prior research.  
Trends in Uncompensated Care Provision  
Health services researchers have been closely monitoring uncompensated care 
trends since the early 1980s. They have generally found that between 1980 and 1990, the 
relative cost of uncompensated care as a percentage of total revenue for all non-federal 
acute care hospitals increased by about 20 percent, with much of the increase occurring in 
the first half of the 1980s. The 1990s saw a reversed trend. Despite the fact that the 
demand for uncompensated care continued to increase, the level of uncompensated care 
generally declined throughout the 1990s (Atkinson, Helms et al. 1997; Cunningham and 
Tu 1997; Mann, Melnick et al. 1997; GAO 2006). These studies also find that 
uncompensated care has not been evenly distributed across hospitals and in fact has been 
increasingly concentrated among a small number of hospitals. Public and nonprofit 
teaching hospitals bear much of the uncompensated care burden. Some studies report a 
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lower level of uncompensated care supply by for-profit hospitals when compared with 
nonprofit and public/nonprofit teaching hospitals (Rosenau 2003). Some others fail to 
show that there is significant performance difference between for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals on this criterion§ (Rosenau 2003; Rosenau and Linder 2003).  
For example, a 2006 General Accounting Office report (GAO 2006) reviewed 
hospital uncompensated care provision by nonprofit, for-profit and government hospitals 
in five states (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas). Their statistics show that 
government hospitals generally devoted the largest share of patient operating expenses to 
uncompensated care. The nonprofit hospitals’ average percentages of uncompensated 
care expenses were greater than for-profit hospitals in four of the five study states 
(Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Indiana). In California, the report did not find significant 
differences among the two hospital groups. In addition, within each hospital group, the 
uncompensated care burden was generally concentrated in a small number of hospitals. 
The authors of the report did not, however, control for any hospital or market 
characteristics that might influence hospital provision of uncompensated care.   
Another study released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expands on 
the GAO’s findings (CBO, 2006). Using the same dataset, the CBO adopted multiple 
regression techniques to adjust the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
                                                 
 
 
§ The empirical literature examining other performance criteria such as cost, efficiency, diffusion of 
technology, or quality of care among hospitals of different ownership types is not discussed here. For a 
systematic evaluation of nonprofit vs. for-profit performance, please see Rosenau, P. V. (2003). 
"Performance Evaluations of For-profit U.S. Hospitals Since 1980." Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership 13(4): 401-423, Rosenau, P. V. and S. H. Linder (2003). "Two Decades of Research Comparing 
For-profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States." Social Science Quarterly 
84(2): 219-241..  
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in uncompensated care provision due to hospital and market characteristics. They report 
an adjusted difference of 0.6 percentage points in uncompensated care as a share of 
operating expenses, with nonprofit hospitals slightly leading for-profit hospitals.  
Schlesinger et al. (1997) used data from a 1987-1988 national survey of 915 
psychiatric specialty and general hospitals to examine the impact of hospital ownership 
and competition, as well as the interaction of these variables on access to hospital care for 
the uninsured. Results from their Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions show that 
controlling for some confounding covariates, nonprofit hospitals operating in 1988 
provided significantly more uncompensated care than their for-profit counterparts. 
However, when competition intensifies, such difference in the provision of 
uncompensated care tends to disappear.  
 Another study by Norton and Staiger (1994) used the 1981 American Hospital 
Association (AHA) annual survey of hospitals to compare the volume of uninsured 
patients treated in nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Employing an instrumental variable 
approach, their study failed to find any significant ownership-related difference in the 
number of uninsured patients served by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals when they are 
located in the same market. However, they also found that for-profit hospitals often self-
select into better-insured markets to avoid those in need of charity care.    
 Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) examined nonprofit vs. for-profit hospital 
response to exogenous shocks in term of their uncompensated care provision. They used 
an unbalanced panel of non-Kaiser acute care hospitals in California from 1981-1989 to 
test the hypotheses that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals react differently to exogenous 
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shocks in the market when they make decisions to supply uncompensated care measured 
as bad debt and charity care expenditures.   The study results show that decreased 
demand for hospital services is associated with an increase in the for-profit hospital 
supply of uncompensated care, and a negative but insignificant change in the nonprofit 
hospital supply of such care. Reduced community expectations as measured by the 
percent of public hospitals in the market are negatively related to for-profit hospital 
uncompensated care provision.  
 Using discharge data from California’s short-term acute care hospitals that were 
operating from 1982-1988, Gruber (1994) investigates the impact of market 
concentration on hospital provision of uncompensated care measured as bad debt and 
charity care charges. Results show that hospitals in less concentrated areas reduced their 
uncompensated care, relative to those in more concentrated areas. However, this study 
did not directly test whether hospitals of different ownership types respond to market 
concentration differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision due to limited 
sample size (398 hospitals including public, for-profits and nonprofits). Instead, the study 
shows that controlling for market concentration and other covariates, for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals’ supply of uncompensated care did not differ significantly.    
 In summary, the literature provides some evidence that nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals might behave differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision as well 
as responses to the exogenous environment. This is relevant to our analysis of regulation 
because if hospitals of different ownership types respond in different ways with regard to 
their uncompensated care provision, they ought to be modeled differently and tested in 
separate equations.  
 11
Theory of Regulation 
In order to predict hospital responses to regulation or in other words, the impact 
of regulation on hospital provision of uncompensated care, it is important to understand 
motivations for states to intervene in private activities. There are mainly three lines of 
theory that provides reasons for government interventions: the public interest theory, the 
private interest theory and regulation for taxation.  
The prevailing theory of regulation since Adam Smith has been known as the 
“normative analysis as a positive theory” or NPT (Joskow and Noll 1981). It regarded 
market failure as the motivating reason for the entry of regulation. Once established, 
regulatory bodies were supposed to lessen or eliminate the inefficiencies engendered by 
the market failure (Peltzman 1989).   Since this theory is based on traditional welfare 
economics, it implies that regulations are implemented to serve the public interest. 
However, the weakness of this theory is its assumption that perfectly informed social 
welfare maximizers are either managing the regulation or running the regulated 
organizations (Winston 1993).   
Private interest theory of regulation starts with the capture theory or CT. It states 
that over time regulatory agencies are controlled by the industry pressing to pass 
supportive regulations (Stigler 1971). In other words, regulation is designed to protect the 
regulated firms from competition. It was later developed by Pelzman (1976) and Becker 
(1983) into a general line of theory called the Chicago theory of regulation or the 
economic theory of regulation (ET). Taken together, the private interest theory implies 
that members of the regulated industry often form effective advocacy coalitions that are 
able to influence policy making for their own protection.  
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The taxation by regulation theory is developed mainly because neither public 
interest theory or private interest theory is able to adequately explain the deliberate and 
continued provision of many services by the regulated industry at lower rates and in 
larger quantities than would be offered in an unregulated competitive or monopolistic 
market (Posner 1971). This theory hence maintains that regulation is designed to realize 
cross-subsidization. That is regulatory authorities may use cross-subsidization (or 
taxation) as a means to regulate the activity of a monopoly by limiting monopoly rents 
and improving consumer welfare.   
Hospital Regulation 
Scholars have provided a variety of reasons for government intervention in the 
hospital industry (Salkever 2000).  Early discussion focused on health care market 
failures. In line with the public interest theory, supporters of this argument posit that 
regulatory agencies act to improve economic performance of hospitals since the market 
itself fails to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Indeed, the hospital industry is 
replete with market failures. First, consumers typically lack perfect information about the 
prices and technical aspects of many medical devices. This lack of information places 
physicians in a strong position to practice opportunistic behavior; second, most health 
care providers (hospitals, clinics, physicians) face portions of downward sloping demand 
curves (i.e., they have some degree of monopoly power); third, there is a lack of 
incentives for both patients and providers to shop around and conserve resources. 
Particularly, there is a problem of moral hazard as a result of traditional forms of health 
insurance; fourth, hospitals tend to compete over quality because consumers are less 
sensitive to prices. It is frequently argued that hospitals often engage in a “medical arms 
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race” and compete through the provision of medically unnecessary services (Feldstein 
1971; Robinson and Luft 1987; Kessler and McClellan 2000).  However, some scholars 
argue that correcting market failure and enhancing efficiency as objectives of regulatory 
agencies are more normative than descriptive. In other words, in principle, government 
should regulate the hospital industry only because public interventions maximize social 
welfare. In practice, the entry of government regulations often cannot be solely explained 
by the public interest theory.   
With the development of more positive theories such as private interest theory and 
taxation by regulation, scholars started to offer additional explanations to hospital 
regulation.  McDonough (1997) examined the regulation and deregulation of hospital rate 
settings in four states: New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. He found 
that key at-stake interest groups were able to manipulate regulation to their own 
advantage. After investigating the Certificate-of-Need (CON) law in all 50 states, Teske 
(2004) concluded that CON has increased hospital revenue, evidence of regulation 
serving the interest of the regulated.  
Paralleling the taxation by regulation or consumer subsidy rationales explained by 
Posner (1971) and others, this line of argument for direct regulation of hospitals posit that 
public interventions such as rate settings and CON offer some protection to hospitals that 
provide charity or uncompensated care. For example, Salkever (2000) noted that as 
managed care plans promote price competition in markets for hospital services, hospital 
profit margins will be squeezed and the willingness of hospitals to supply charity care 
will diminish. Price regulation in this case is able to pressure major payers to cover a 
portion of the hospital’s uncompensated care costs.  
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The next section examines the adoption, implementation and impact of specific 
regulations such as Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws, Any-Willing-Provider (AWP) or 
Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) regulation, rate-setting/uncompensated care pool regulation, 
state hospital conversion regulation, and community benefit mandates which are the 
focus of this study.  
Certificate-of-Need 
Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws require that hospitals obtain approval from health 
planning agencies for investment related to new buildings or expansion of services in 
excess of certain dollar thresholds. The original rationale of this regulatory intervention, 
which is to control escalating hospital costs, is embedded in views that hospitals will 
duplicate services and invest in costly excess capacity because they tend to compete on a 
non-price basis (Folland, Stano et al. 2004). In the hospital industry, consumers are 
believed to be largely insensitive to the price of care due to moral hazard resulting from 
the proliferation of health insurance. Left unchecked, unnecessary duplication of facilities 
as well as the mere availability of facilities leads to higher cost of care.  
CON regulation began when New York became the first state instituting the law 
in 1964.  In 1972, the federal government enacted investment regulation with the passage 
of Section 1122 of the Social Security Act Amendments. Section 1122 provided for the 
denial of Medicare and Medicaid cost reimbursement to hospitals expanding capacity 
without prior approval by local planning agencies. In 1974, the federal government 
passed the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act (§P.L.93-641) 
which provided federal funds for states to implement investment laws. As a consequence, 
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CON soon gained in popularity among states. Most states adopted CON regulations in the 
mid-1970s. By 1980 all 50 states had some form of CON or Section 1122 agreement.  
In 1984, Section 1122 expired with the implementation of Medicare’s prospective 
payment system. In 1986, the federal government ended its National Health Planning and 
Resource Development Act that supported the development of CON programs (Santerre, 
2005). Absent federal support, 14 states completely repealed CON regulation.  However, 
six states (Arkansas, Nebraska, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin) retained their 
CON regulation for nursing homes and long term care services, and as many as 31 states 
maintained their complete CON laws.  
CON laws may improve access to care for the indigent and uninsured in many 
ways. Regulators may use CON to prevent entry of potential competitors who may 
“cherry-pick” profitable services, hence undermining the ability of existing providers to 
sustain money-losing services such as care for the indigent (Alpha-Center, 1999; Conover 
& Sloan, 2003). CON may also be used to give providers incentives to build facilities in 
underserved areas that have a greater demand for services such as uncompensated care 
(Lewin-ICF & Center, 1991). CON is further used to protect safety net providers who 
form the backbone of uncompensated care provision by increasing their financing margin 
(Mendelson & Arnold, 1993). CON may explicitly require providers to supply certain 
level of uncompensated care as a condition of obtaining CON approval. Lastly, some 
states use CON to encourage development of nonprofit hospitals that are supposed to 
provide more uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals (Alpha Center, 1999).   
Few studies provide a direct link between CON and hospital uncompensated care 
provision. Mendelson and Arnold (1993) found that regulators in Ohio used CON to 
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protect access to care for the disadvantaged by denying applications that could have 
adverse effects on the financial viability of safety net hospitals in inner cities. Lewin and 
Alpha Center’s report (1991) to the Ohio Department of Health provided similar evidence. 
In Pennsylvania, the CON program also tended to reward providers who agreed to supply 
more uncompensated care (Alpha-Center 1999).  However, an evaluation of the CON 
program in Michigan yielded only minimal support for a moderate beneficial effect of 
CON on serving the uninsured (Conover and Sloan 2003).  
Linkages between CON and uncompensated care were most thoroughly 
investigated in studies in Florida and California. Using a unique Florida data set on CON 
rulings from 1983 to 1986, Fournier and Campbell (1997) examined the relationship 
between CON licenses and uncompensated care provision (measured by the dollar 
amount of indigent care provided by the hospital and a relative measure constructed by 
dividing the dollar amount of indigent care by hospital bed size). They found that, 
controlling for the endogeneity of indigent care, regulators in Florida systematically 
awarded CON licenses to hospitals providing greater amount of care to the poor. 
Although the validity of their instrument, hospital teaching status, is questionable, the 
study offers some evidence of the impact of CON on the provision of indigent hospital 
care.  Similar results were reported in their earlier, more descriptive study of Florida’s 
CON (Campbell and Fournier 1993).  
Campbell and Ahern (1993) used two-period California data to explore the effect 
of CON on uncompensated care provision.  Specifically, they run separate multivariate 
regressions for California hospitals in 1963 and 1987 to examine the determinants of 
hospital provision of uncompensated care.  They found a positive relationship between 
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net profitability of private nonprofit hospitals and the amount of uncompensated care they 
provide. They argue that this finding suggests government regulators reward heavily 
burdened uncompensated care providers with profitable CON licenses.  Since no CON 
variables are actually used in estimating the amount of uncompensated care given by 
providers, this study fails to demonstrate a direct connection between CON activities and 
actual provision of indigent care (Conover and Sloan 1998).  
Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Law 
The Any-Willing-Provider (AWP) law requires that managed care organizations 
accept any provider willing to abide by the plans’ terms and conditions as well as their 
payment rates. The Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) law requires that a managed care enrollee 
be reimbursed for health care services outside of the managed care plan networks.   
The arguments for the adoption of AWP/FOC are threefold. AWP increases 
access to care and, at the same time, improves quality of care. Many proponents of AWP 
believe that AWP promotes health care continuity by allowing patients to maintain 
relations with providers who have been their regular source of care. These laws also 
resulted from the negative consumer reactions to the restrictions of managed care 
although they may increase the costs of health care by relaxing these restrictions. 
There are wide variations among states instituting AWP/FOC laws. Some laws 
affect virtually all providers (e.g., hospitals, physicians, pharmacies) whereas others only 
restrict pharmacies. As our study examines the effect of regulations on hospitals, we 
include only AWP/FOC laws relating to hospitals. AWP laws applying to hospitals were 
enacted as early as 1984 in Georgia. However, since the 1990s, the laws gained 
popularity from concerns about potential adverse effects of managed care selective 
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contracting. Thirty states had enacted either AWP or FOC, or both, for pharmacies by 
1996. Thirteen states have laws relating to hospitals, and 17 have laws covering physician 
services (Ohsfeldt, Morrisey et al. 1998).  
 Although there is no direct evidence that AWP/FOC laws influence hospital 
provision of uncompensated care, some studies argue that such laws stifle competition 
among hospitals, which may in turn affect their financial ability to provide 
uncompensated care (Gruber 1994; Hellinger 1995). Gruber (1994) used hospital panel 
data from 1984 to1988 to examine the effect of managed care selective contracting on 
uncompensated care provision in California. He found that there was a large fall in net 
revenue and net income in more competitive hospital markets after the advent of selective 
contracting by managed care organizations.  This result suggests that when competitive 
pressure from selective contracting increased, uncompensated care to the uninsured 
declined because hospitals are less capable of cross-subsidizing such care. Since 
AWP/FOC laws restrict the extent to which managed care organizations selectively 
contract with hospitals, the competitiveness of hospital markets might have decreased. 
One plausible explanation is that with AWP/FOC laws, hospitals no longer enjoy 
guaranteed volume of patients when all hospitals that agree to the terms set by managed 
care organization are able to contract with them. As a result, hospitals do not have the 
incentive to lower their cost in order to compete for managed care contracts, and hence 
lower levels of competition.  
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Hospital Rate Settings and Uncompensated Care Pools 
These two regulations are discussed together because empirical studies of the 
impact of rate setting programs on uncompensated care focus exclusively on its mandated 
uncompensated pools.  
Rate setting programs were widely believed to be designed to alleviate the 
perceived problem of rapidly growing hospital expenditures (Cone and Dranove, 1988).  
New York was the first state to enact a mandatory rate setting law in 1969 (Salkever, 
2000). Rate setting soon spread to other states with some variations. However, in a 
typical rate setting program, a legal authority is established for approving the rates that 
hospitals charge. With Medicare’s shift to a perspective payment system in the early 
1980s and the emergence of managed care and capitation as viable cost-control 
mechanisms in the late 1980s, states started terminating their rate setting programs. In the 
early 1980s, about 30 states employed some form of hospital rate-setting as a cost-
containment device, but today none of these states except Maryland still use hospital rate-
setting (McDonough 1997; Volpp, Ketcham et al. 2005).  
In the early 1980s, some states started to mandate hospital uncompensated care 
pools as part of their rate setting programs. Although all but one of these states eliminated 
their rate setting programs, some kept the uncompensated pools requirement. New 
mandates replaced the old hospital-specific add-on to rates and applied a uniform 
surcharge. The resulting funds were then pooled and redistributed to hospitals according 
to their amounts of uncompensated care. Hospitals with low loads of uncompensated care 
were net contributors, while those with high levels were net recipients. The goals of 
pooling were to improve the financial condition of hospitals with high uninsured care 
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loads, more equitably fund uncompensated care, and improve access for the uninsured by 
removing disincentives for hospitals, particularly private hospitals, to treat uninsured 
patients (Bovbjerg, Cuellar et al. 2000). In the 1990s, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New York, South Carolina and Virginia all had such pools. Since Maryland 
still maintains its rate setting system, hospitals are reimbursed for their uncompensated 
care as part of the rate setting program (Fraser 1990). 
Using data from a sample of New Jersey short-term, acute care hospitals from 
1979 to 1987, Dunn and Chen (1994) employed a pre- and post-design to assess the 
impacts of the introduction of uncompensated care payment on the overall level of 
uncompensated care provision as well as the distribution of uncompensated care across 
hospitals. Their study shows that hospitals in New Jersey did not significantly increase 
their uncompensated care after the implementation of this new regulation. However, there 
is evidence that this regulation has resulted in a more even distribution of uncompensated 
care burden across hospitals as indicated by a positive effect on the financial condition of 
hospitals providing a disproportionately larger share of this care. 
Using an updated New Jersey data from 1986 to1990, Gaskin (1997) estimated 
the impact of the uncompensated care pool on both inpatient and outpatient 
uncompensated care. He further investigated how uncompensated care pools affect 
hospitals’ collection efforts. Evidence from this study suggests that such pools have 
actually induced hospitals to increase their inpatient uncompensated care by an average 
of 14.8% and statewide uncompensated care by $360 million during 1987-1990. This 
study did not find evidence that uncompensated care pools created a moral hazard 
problem by decreasing the state’s collection efforts.  
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Spencer (1998) examined the redistributive effect of the uncompensated care pool 
across hospitals in New York. Using data from 1981 to 1987, the author found that such 
pools did result in routine care being redistributed away from hospitals that traditionally 
provided a disproportionate share of uncompensated care to the uninsured, whereas 
highly technological care was not significantly redistributed.  
Earlier studies using New York hospital data all found that levels of 
uncompensated care increased due to changes in regulation. Thorpe (1988) found that 
during the post-regulation period from 1983 to 1985, uncompensated care increased 
significantly. Similar results were found in another study by Thorpe and Phelps (1991). 
However, they further argued that hospitals in New York did not increase charity care in 
proportion to the amount of the grant received. Thorpe and Spencer (1991) later used a 
longer panel (1981-1987) and found that pools have led to increased access for the 
uninsured with public hospitals leading private hospitals in the amount of care provided.  
Hospital Conversion Regulations 
These state regulations impose state oversight on the process of converting public 
or non-profit facilities to for-profit status through requiring attorney general approval, 
advance notification, and community involvement. This state intervention was partly 
motivated by the concern that conversions from public or non-profit hospitals to for-
profit status might harm access to care for the low income uninsured and underinsured 
population by reducing the amount of charity care provided.  Stricter oversight (i.e., state 
monitoring in addition to federal oversight) might protect the community’s charitable 
interests. As of 1997, 24 states and District of Columbia have enacted such laws to affect 
conversions from nonprofit/public hospital to for-profit status (GAO 1997). 
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Little evidence exists concerning the effect of hospital conversion regulation on 
conversions or uncompensated care, although a number of studies have examined the 
impact of actual conversions on the provision of uncompensated care. These studies 
noted either insignificant differences in the level of uncompensated care provision in 
nonprofit to for-profit conversions (Young, Desai et al. 1997; Needleman, Lamphere et al. 
1999; Young and Desai 1999) or significantly less uncompensated care provided to the 
indigent when such conversions occur (Thorpe, Florence et al. 2000). This literature 
implies that if the presence of conversion regulations successfully inhibits or stimulates 
conversion activity, these regulations may have profound impact on hospital provision of 
uncompensated care.  
Community Benefit Mandates 
Community benefit mandates require that nonprofit hospitals provide a sufficient 
amount of community benefit** to justify their tax exempt status (Noble, Hyams et al. 
1998). Prior to the mid-1980s, most states used a broad community benefit approach in 
defining tax exempt status for health care providers (Noble, Hyams et al. 1998; Colombo 
2006). However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, motivated by the escalating concerns 
that the line between nonprofit and for-profit was blurring, several states began to 
question the tax exemption status for nonprofit hospitals (Potter and Longest, 1994; 
Noble, Hyams, and Kane, 1998). As a result, some states adopted explicit charity care 
                                                 
 
 
** Community benefit commonly include uncompensated care, health promotion services, research and 
education, open access to services and community health orientation. Please see Ginn, G. O. and C. B. 
Moseley (2006). "The impact of state community benefit laws on the community health orientation and 
health promotion services of hospitals." J Health Polit Policy Law 31(2): 321-44..  
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tests in defining tax exempt status. In 1993, Texas became the first state to pass 
legislation that requires hospitals to provide a specific percentage of hospital net patient 
revenues for charity care and other community benefits. Other states have adopted a 
broader community benefit test and required public reporting for a variety of community 
benefits, including charity care (Noble, Hyams, and Kane 1998). 
We did not find studies that explicitly examined the effect of these mandates on 
hospital uncompensated care provision. Only one study indirectly investigated the effect 
of state community benefit laws and guidelines on community health orientation and the 
provision of hospital-based health orientation activities including uncompensated care 
provision. Using a sample that included all not-for-profit and investor-owned acute-care 
hospitals in the United States during the year 2000, Ginn and Moseley (2006) used 
multiple regressions to test the effect of community benefit laws and type of ownership 
while controlling for organizational and environmental variables. The results indicated 
that, on average, nonprofit hospitals in the ten states with community benefit 
laws/guidelines reported significantly more community health orientation activities than 
did nonprofit hospitals in the forty other states. In addition, on average, for-profit 
hospitals in the ten states with laws/guidelines reported significantly more community 
health orientation activities than did comparable hospitals in the forty other states. The 
study also found that community benefit laws had the effect of decreasing ownership-
related differences in reported community health orientation activities.  
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Summary of Literature Review 
The literature provides some evidence that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
might behave differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision as well as 
responses to the exogenous environment. This suggests that they ought to be examined in 
separate models.  Furthermore, much of the research on regulation and hospital provision 
of uncompensated care has focused on uncompensated care pools (and pools as part of 
hospital rate setting programs). A majority of studies found that such subsidies have 
successfully increased the level of uncompensated care provision in the market (Thorpe 
1988; Thorpe and Spencer 1991; Gaskin 1997; Spencer 1998). Two other studies 
provided additional evidence that uncompensated care pools redistributed provision of 
such care among hospitals (Dunn and Chen 1994; Spencer 1998).  However, one of them 
fails to find that uncompensated care pool increases the level of uncompensated care 
provided in New Jersey (Dunn and Chen 1994).  
Although researchers have also examined the impact of CON on hospital behavior, 
few studies provide a direct link between CON and hospital uncompensated care 
provision. Most studies presented descriptive evidence from evaluation reports of state 
CON programs (Lewin-ICF and Center 1991; Mendelson and Arnold 1993; Alpha-Center 
1999; Conover and Sloan 2003). They found that CON has been used by regulators to 
increase access to care for the vulnerable population. Only two studies provided some 
limited empirical evidence on this question (Campbell and Ahern 1993; Campbell and 
Fournier 1993; Fournier and Campbell 1997). Their studies show that in Florida and 
California, hospitals that provide more uncompensated care are systematically rewarded 
under CON legislation.  
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The impact of other regulatory programs on hospital provision of uncompensated 
care is inadequately explored. Only one study indirectly examined the effect of a 
community benefit requirement on uncompensated care provision (Ginn and Moseley 
2006). Their results supported the hypothesis that nonprofit hospitals offer significantly 
more community health-oriented services (which include uncompensated care) in the 
presence of community benefit mandates.  
The review of the literature on regulatory environment and hospital supply of 
uncompensated care also revealed some shortcomings. First, most previous studies have 
examined hospitals’ uncompensated care provision and regulatory environment by 
focusing on a single regulation such as hospital uncompensated pool or certificate-of-
need (CON) regulation.  Recent studies have indicated that regulatory programs should 
be analyzed in the context of the larger regulatory environment (Sloan, Morrisey et al. 
1988; Antel, Ohsfeldt et al. 1995). The interplay of incentives offered by different 
regulatory programs may have resulted in unexpected consequences that cannot be 
predicted by analyzing a single regulation. In addition, due to interactions among 
different regulations, the combined effects of a regulation bundle may be different from a 
regulation acting alone. Evidence from other industry studies further suggest that 
regulations, particularly of different parts of an industry, should be viewed as a system 
because, for instance, when regulation controls price, firms will find other ways to 
compete (i.e., engaging in non-price competition) (Viscusi, Harrington et al. 2005).   
Second, early works have predominately used data from a single state (e.g., New 
Jersey, New York, California or Florida). Although some CON studies have used a 
dichotomous variable to compare regulatory effects in markets with and without 
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regulation using data from all 50 states, none has investigated the effect of CON on 
uncompensated care provision using national data. The shortcoming of employing data 
from a single state is the inability to compare differences in regulations among the states. 
Further, even if studies have used national data, the comparison states are not completely 
free of similar regulations if they fail to take into account a broader scope of regulations. 
Regulations other than the one under investigation might have confounded the results if 
researchers are not cautious about their comparison groups.   
Finally, existing studies need to be updated. An overwhelming number of studies 
used data in the 1980s and early 1990s, a period which is no longer of current policy 
interest. There have been dramatic changes in the health care marketplace during the late 
1990s and early 2000s (e.g., increased competition and cost control and reduced support 
for care of the uninsured).  These major changes in the health care market may be altering 
the effectiveness of existing programs. Results obtained from recent data will prove to be 
more relevant to formulate policies for the current health care system.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, TYPOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Theoretical Framework 
As suggested by previous literature, hospitals of different ownership types differ 
in term of their uncompensated care provision and their different responses might be 
influenced by the regulatory environment. Theoretical models of hospital uncompensated 
care supply are useful in examining hospital response to and the impact of different 
policy options since these frameworks help illuminate determinants of hospital 
uncompensated care provision.   We draw on the work of Frank and Salkever (1991), 
Gruber (1994), and Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) and simplify their models to 
investigate equilibrium hospital behavior when the regulatory environment changes.  
In these models, nonprofit hospitals are assumed to be concerned about the health 
of the entire community, including the economically disadvantaged. Their supply of 
uncompensated care is believed to be socially motivated, subject to financial resource 
constraints. In contrast, for-profit hospitals are hypothesized to supply uncompensated 
care to the extent that doing so maximizes profits because they are concerned that they 
might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce uncompensated 
care. For-profit hospitals’ supply of uncompensated care therefore is a business strategy 
that may enhance a hospital’s reputation and reduce the expected penalty of under-
producing such care.  
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Frank and Salkever (1991) focus on the supply of charity services by nonprofit 
hospitals. They argue that price-taking private nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize 
utility (U) which is a function†† of net revenue R and unmet indigent care need N.  
U = U (R, N)     or 
U = U [(QP +rD +E – C(Q +D)), (T-D-H-G)] 
where  
QP = the average revenue for compensated care; 
Q = the number of paying patients 
r = revenue per indigent patient; 
D = the number of indigent patients; 
E = sum of endowment income; 
C = hospital’s cost function 
T = total indigent care need; 
H = other private hospitals 
G = public hospitals 
In this model, nonprofit hospitals earn net revenue to subsidize uncompensated 
care. It also predicts that increases in the supply of charity care by other hospitals in the 
market crowds out indigent care in the nonprofit hospital. A slight variation, the “impure 
                                                 
 
 
†† It should be noted that the argument R in the nonprofit utility function may be viewed as a proxy 
representing “profits” spent to pursue all objectives perceived by the hospital’s managers or trustees other 
than uncompensated care provision. For example, Newhouse proposed a utility function with quality and 
quantity as arguments subject to a breakeven constraint (please refer to Newhouse, J. (1970). "Toward a 
theory of nonprofit institutions: an economic model of a hospital." American Economic Review 60(1): 64-
74.) The model offered by Pauly suggests that hospitals seek to maximize income of physicians or decision 
makers. The specification of the arguments does not however alter the results (see Pauly, M. V. (1987). 
"Nonprofit firms in medical markets." American Economic Review 77(2): 257-262.)  
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altruism” model (Frank and Salkever 1991), was proposed to account for nonprofit 
hospital’s rivalry motivation, which leads to a potential smaller crowd-out effect by other 
hospitals in the market. In this model, a third argument (Z) indicating the hospital’s 
performance in supplying charity care relative to its rivals was added to the utility 
function so that nonprofit hospitals are assumed to compete with other private hospitals 
by providing uncompensated care.   
Gruber (1994) simplified the above model as nonprofit hospitals maximizing a 
utility function V [R, U], subject to R= pq – c(q) – U 
where  
R = net revenue,  
U= uncompensated care,  
p = price per unit of service,  
q = quantity of services,  
c(q) = hospital cost function; cq > 0, cqq> 0.  
In contrast to Frank and Salkever’s framework which takes price as exogenous, 
this model assumes a monopolistic hospital market, or in other words, prices charged to 
private paying patients are endogenous.  This assumption was supported by literature 
arguing that the medical market place can be best described as monopolistically 
competitive, due to the presence of imperfect, costly price and quality information 
(Dranove, Satterthwaite et al. 1986; Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992). However, the 
difference in assumptions does not change the predictions drawn from these models.  
The model developed by Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) was motivated by 
Gray (1991) to explain uncompensated care provision by for-profit hospitals. This model 
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assumes that for-profit hospitals provide charity care because they are concerned that 
they might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce 
uncompensated care. These costs might take the form of penalties such as failure to be 
granted a CON or loss of state Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. For-
profit hospitals are hence assumed to maximize the profit function‡‡ (Π) with: 
Π = QP (Q;d) – C(Q, U) – F – L(e – U) 
where  
U = uncompensated care;  
QP (Q;d) = the average revenue for compensated care; 
Q = the patient days of compensated care; 
d = demand curve shift parameter;  
C (Q, U) = variable cost of producing Q and U; 
F = fixed cost 
L(e – U) = expected penalty cost.  
Based on previous research and given different motivations between nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals, a nonprofit hospital’s utility function (V) can be mathematically 
expressed as:  
Nonprofit: V≡ max [R, U] ；subject to§§ R = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U) 
                                                 
 
 
‡‡ For derivations of the for-profit model, please refer to Banks, et al. (1997). "Uncompensated hospital 
care: charitable mission or profitable business decision?" Health Econ 6(2): 133-43.. 
§§ Nonprofit organizations face a non-distribution constraint, which means they cannot legally distribute 
any of their residual earnings to stakeholders. Santerre, R. E. and J. A. Vernon (2006). "The consumer 
welfare implications of the hospital ownership mix in the US: an exploratory study." Ibid. 15(11): 1187-99.    
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To simplify the derivations, we follow Banks et al (1997) and assume a special 
case where hospitals earn net revenue to subsidize uncompensated care. In other words, 
we assume that nonprofit hospitals maximize uncompensated care:  
   V’≡ max [U]; subject to F = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U)=0  
whereas a for-profit hospital’s objective is to maximize profit (Π):  
For-profit: Π ≡max [QP (Q;d) +rU] – C(Q, U) – L(e – U) 
where  
R = net revenue 
U = uncompensated care;  
QP (Q;d) = the average revenue for compensated care; 
Q = the patient days of compensated care; 
d = demand curve shift parameter such as competition;  
r = revenue per indigent care patient*** 
C (Q, U) = variable cost of producing Q and U; 
L(e – U) = expected penalty cost.  
These theoretical models assume that hospitals are price setters and they exercise 
control over the amount of uncompensated care supplied. In addition, the medically 
indigent demand for uncompensated care is assumed to exceed hospital desired supply.  
For nonprofit hospitals, solving for their constraint: 
F = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U)=0 
                                                 
 
 
*** r theoretically is zero for indigent care as this care is uncompensated. However, with various subsidies 
this care can be compensated at a rate that equals to r (0 ≤ r ≤ p).  
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QP (Q;d)+rU = C(Q, U)  
This equation implies that nonprofit hospitals supply uncompensated care to the 
point when marginal revenue equals marginal cost (i.e., MR = MC)†††.  
For for-profit hospitals: the first order conditions (FOC) are 
πQ = QPQ + P - CQ = 0 
πU = r - CU + L′= 0 
These FOCs imply that for-profit hospitals supply uncompensated care to the 
point when marginal benefit equals marginal cost (i.e., MB = MC).  
Solving for the constraint and the FOCs, we obtain the following comparative 
statics for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respectively (Table 1‡‡‡). 
                                                 
 
 
††† Given that net revenue is modeled as a proxy for “activities” that produce utilities/benefits, the marginal 
revenue really is another way of labeling marginal utility/benefits.  
‡‡‡ D is the determinant of matrix
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Table 1: Comparative Static Results for Nonprofit and For-profit Model 
Nonprofit For-profit 
Ud = PdQ/CU          <0 Ud = [-CQUPQd]/D                                  >0 
Ur = -U/-CU          >0 Ur = -[2PQ + QPQQ – CQQ]/D                 >0 
 Ue = [(QPQQ + 2PQ – CQQ)(-L″)]/D       >0 
 
These results delineate the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospital 
supply of uncompensated care. Nonprofit hospitals provide uncompensated care because 
supplying such care increases their utility. They produce uncompensated care to the point 
where the marginal revenue is balanced by the marginal cost of uncompensated care 
provision. However, for-profit hospitals provide uncompensated care because they are 
concerned that they might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce 
uncompensated care. Unlike their nonprofit counterparts, for-profit hospitals treat 
uncompensated care provision as a profit maximizing strategy. Producing such care does 
not add utility to for-profit hospitals but it maximizes their profits by lowering their 
penalty costs. The optimum level of uncompensated care supplied by for-profit hospitals 
is achieved by equating marginal cost with the hospital’s marginal benefit of producing 
such care.  
These differences indicate that nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals would 
respond to different incentives and environmental changes differently. Nonprofit 
hospitals respond to a downward shift in demand by reducing the amount of 
uncompensated care provision because decreased demand for paid care implies decreased 
profits available for financing uncompensated care. An increase in the marginal revenue 
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that results from an increased number of paying patients will increase supply of 
uncompensated care. Similarly, an increase in the revenue per indigent patient (usually in 
the form of subsidies) increases uncompensated care. Nonprofit hospitals will also 
respond to increased competition by reducing their charity care output. This is because 
when competition intensifies, the price for paying patients goes down. As a result, 
nonprofit hospitals have less revenue from the paying patients to cross-subsidize 
uncompensated care. They therefore have to decrease the amount of uncompensated care 
in order to survive the fierce competition.   On the contrary, for-profit hospitals may 
increase the supply of uncompensated care when market demand for compensated care 
decreases since the concurrent decrease in paid care reduces the marginal cost of 
producing uncompensated care. They would respond to competition by increasing their 
uncompensated care supply. One explanation is that the price for paying patients 
decreases as competition increases. Consequently, the decrease in the price of paid care 
lowers the marginal cost of providing uncompensated care. For-profit hospitals therefore 
supply more uncompensated care as the marginal cost of providing such care decreases. 
On the other hand, the for-profit model also predicts that for-profit hospitals will respond 
to the level of community expectation or will incur penalties resulting from failure to 
meet community expectation.  
Typology 
Before we generate any predictions regarding the impact of regulatory 
environment on hospital’s provision of uncompensated care, it is crucial that we develop 
a typology so that regulations can be grouped and examined in meaningful ways. The 
comparative static analysis represents a convenient tool for this categorization.  The 
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analysis illuminates different mechanisms through which regulations exert an impact on 
hospital behavior. We hence categorize different regulatory environment on this basis. 
Since both CON and AWP/FOC affect hospital supply of uncompensated care by either 
increasing or decreasing competition d, we label these regulations as competition 
regulations. Uncompensated care pools and pools as part of the rate setting programs 
increase revenue per indigent care patient r, and we classify this type of regulation as 
subsidies.  Because states use requirements such as conversion oversight and community 
benefit requirements to explicitly communicate expectations for community services such 
as uncompensated care, we categorize these regulations as mandates. This taxonomy 
provides us a framework to organize seemingly complicated regulatory environments so 
as to improve our understanding of the different mechanisms through which regulations 
can affect hospital behavior. The next section uses CON, uncompensated care pool, and 
community benefit requirement regulations as examples to illustrate how hypotheses can 
be developed for each type and/or individual regulation.  
Hypotheses 
Previous research shows that CON, as an entry barrier, has reduced competition 
by maintaining high levels of industry concentration and restricting supply of services. 
After analyzing the impact of CON on entry of new firms into the dialysis industry, Ford 
and Kaserman (1993) found that the presence of CON laws significantly reduced the 
entry and expansion of dialysis firms. Gruber (1994) studied the effect of competitive 
pressure on hospital provision of uncompensated care. He found that nonprofit hospitals 
provide more uncompensated care in more concentrated markets. These findings, in 
conjunction with predicted effect of competition on hospital provision of uncompensated 
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care discussed in the previous section, led us to conclude that nonprofit hospitals may 
increase their uncompensated care supply in response to CON laws.  
For-profit hospitals may respond to CON by either decreasing or increasing their 
uncompensated care supply. This is because on the one hand, CON has constrained 
market competition and promoted profits generated by private paying patients. When 
paid care becomes more profitable, the opportunity cost of providing uncompensated care 
(i.e., cost of forgoing paid care) rises. For-profit hospitals therefore would reduce their 
uncompensated care supply when CON increases industry concentration. On the other 
hand, for-profit hospitals may also perceive the failure to obtain CON as a profit loss, and 
hence increase their uncompensated care provision in states with such a regulation. The 
resulting direction of CON’s impact on for-profit hospitals remains undetermined.   
 
H1: ceteris paribus, nonprofit hospitals in states with CON laws will provide 
more uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such a regulation. 
H2: ceteris paribus, for-profit hospitals in states with CON laws will provide less 
or more uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such a regulation. 
 
With increasing direct subsidies such as reimbursement from uncompensated care 
pools, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals should increase their uncompensated care 
supply. Intuitively, this happens because reimbursing hospitals based on their 
uncompensated care cost increases the revenue per indigent patient. Therefore, we expect 
to see hospitals increase their uncompensated care supply when provided such a subsidy.  
Profit maximizing for-profit hospitals might also perceive the loss of pool subsidies as 
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penalties resulting from failure to meet the health care needs of the community. In this 
case, they will increase their supply of uncompensated care when such subsidies raise 
their expected penalty cost. Therefore, the direction of the signs on nonprofit and for-
profit hospital uncompensated care provision is expected to be the same.  
  
H3: ceteris paribus, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in states with 
uncompensated care pool regulation or subsidy regulation will provide more 
uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such regulations. 
 
The responses of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals under community benefit 
requirement regulations are rather ambiguous.  Given the mandate for nonprofit hospitals, 
we expect that they comply with the regulations by increasing their uncompensated care 
supply (if they had not provided the desired level). However, if community benefit 
requirement regulations help to improve the overall health of the community, given that 
hospitals in states with such laws typically provide better access to primary/preventive 
care (Ginn and Moseley 2006), we might see a decrease in uncompensated inpatient care 
as a result of a decline in the demand for inpatient care. We might also see such a 
negative relationship between community benefit requirement laws and nonprofit 
hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care if the community benefit requirement is set 
below the level at which hospitals actually provide uncompensated care. These laws 
could provide a signal to reduce nonprofit hospitals’ provision of care by suggesting that 
their prior levels of such care are above the levels expected by the community. 
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Although these mandates are not intended to be binding for the for-profit hospitals, 
they send a signal to health care providers of what is expected by the community. Since 
for-profit hospitals perceive that they could incur costs if they fail to meet community 
expectation, we might expect to see a significant increase in the level of uncompensated 
care provided by for-profit hospitals.   
However, there might be a “crowd-out” effect as a result of these mandates as 
Frank and Salkever (1991) predict. If for-profit hospitals increase their uncompensated 
care supply, nonprofits serving the same market will tend to reduce their provision of 
uncompensated care. A number of empirical studies supported this argument (Horwitz 
2005; Schlesinger and Gray 2006). The extended “impure altruism” model adds to this 
prediction by arguing that this effect is likely to be moderate or weak if we further 
assume that a nonprofit hospital maximizes performance in supplying charity care 
relative to its rivals. If an increase in for-profit hospital’s uncompensated care provision 
results in a decrease of supply from its rivalry nonprofit hospital, the mandates could lead 
to a different distribution of uncompensated care supply in the market.  
Another piece of evidence complicates this prediction even further. Some studies 
have shown that in mixed ownership markets, for-profit hospitals provide significantly 
less charity care when nonprofit hospitals provide high level of uncompensated care 
(Clement, White et al. 2002). This phenomenon represents a reversed crowd-out effect: 
for-profit crowd-out by nonprofit hospitals. This means if nonprofit hospitals respond to 
mandates by increasing their supply of care, for-profit hospitals will decrease their supply. 
After all, these mandates are not legally intended for for-profit hospitals and might not be 
binding for them. The final direction of the signs therefore remains an empirical matter.  
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H4: ceteris paribus, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in states with 
community benefit requirement laws will provide more/less uncompensated care than 
their counterparts in states without such regulations. 
 
 
In addition to behavioral differences between hospitals, we are also interested in 
regulatory interactions. A few studies suggest that regulations working together may in 
some cases enhance the effectiveness of one another. For example, Antel et al. (1995) 
examined the effects of various regulation (e.g., rate setting, CON, Medicare perspective 
payment and Nixon-era Economic Stabilization Program) on hospital costs.  Using a two-
decade-long panel dataset of the 48 continental states, they found that although few 
regulations under investigation have had a significant effect on controlling hospital costs, 
rate regulation, interacting with Medicare perspective payment, has successfully limited 
the cost increase. We therefore predict that there might be interaction effects in the sense 
that an individual regulation will be more/less effective in the presence of other 
regulations.  
CON, interacting with uncompensated care pools may complement each other and 
increase the uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals. This is expected 
because both CON and pool are predicted to be positively related to nonprofit hospital 
supply of uncompensated care. CON improves nonprofit hospital’s ability to cross-
subsidize care for the uninsured. When given extra incentive by public subsidies such as 
uncompensated care pools, nonprofit hospitals will provide more uncompensated care 
 40
comparing with comparable hospitals in states that do not have both regulations.  For for-
profit hospitals, the sign on the interaction term between CON and uncompensated care 
pool is undetermined. CON is expected to decrease uncompensated care provision by for-
profit hospitals since the cost of providing unpaid care increases when CON stifles 
competition. However, uncompensated care pool gives for-profit hospitals incentive to 
increase their uncompensated care provision. Which impact dominates when states 
implement both regulations remains an empirical issue.  
The evaluation of interaction effects between CON and community benefit 
requirement laws is another empirical issue because the impact of community benefit 
requirement laws can be either positive or negative for both types of hospitals. The sign 
on the interaction between community benefit requirement and uncompensated care pool 
as well as the interaction of all three regulations remain uncertain for similar reasons.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Empirical Specification 
Our model specification follows the theoretical framework described in the 
previous section. A hospital’s provision of uncompensated care is influenced by the 
regulatory environment, institutional/market factors that affect the hospital’s capacity to 
supply uncompensated care, and demand for uncompensated care.  
We treat nonfederal, short-term hospitals as our study unit to examine different 
organizational responses to the regulatory environment and possible policy interactions. 
A general specification of our empirical model is: 
UCit = β0 + β1Hospitalit + β2Marketit + β3Regulationit+β4Year+ β5State+ itε  
where i = 1 to N, t = 1 to T; UCit is our measure for hospital i uncompensated care 
provision by services in year t; Hospital is a vector of hospital organizational 
characteristics to measure a hospital’s capacity to provide uncompensated care; Market is 
a vector of market variables that can affect the supply of, or demand for, uncompensated 
care in a market; Regulation, our key focus, is a vector of regulatory variables that 
measures states’ different regulatory environments; Year represents year dummies; State 
represents a vector of states dummies, capturing state specific trends; itε  is a composite 
error term that can be expressed as itiit ηαε += , where iα  is a hospital specific error 
component term; and itη represents the idiosyncratic error term.  
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Data  
We rely on three primary data sources for the period 2002 – 2004 for the current 
research. (1) The American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals 
(2002, 2003, and 2004) collects data from all U.S. hospitals and includes a variety of 
organizational and operational characteristics such as availability of services, utilization, 
personnel, finances and governance; (2) The Area Resource File (ARF) (2005) contains 
information on market characteristics as well as community demographics that may 
affect demand for uncompensated care. Compiled by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), ARF is a national county-level collection of datasets from more 
than 50 sources including the Current Population Survey (CPS), InterStudy, and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. It  includes information on healthcare professionals, health 
professions training, health facilities, hospital utilization, hospital expenditures, county 
population and economics, as well as county-level socioeconomic and geographic codes 
that allow us to merge these data with other files;  (3) The State Inpatient Database (SID) 
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) (2002, 2003, and 2004) 
contains detailed information on over 90 percent of inpatient discharges from all 
community hospitals in 20 states. Since hospital discharge data include zip code 
information on patient residence, we are able to define markets using patient flows and 
test if differences in market definition will affect study results. 
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Construction of the Sample 
We used HCUP SID data for seventeen states (AZ, CO, FL, IA, KY, MA, MD, 
NV, NJ, NY, OR, RI, UT, WA, WV, WI and NC) for information on the total number of 
admissions and payer types to obtain the percentage of admissions for the uninsured. 
These states are selected based on their geographical representativeness and diverse 
regulatory environments.   
Geographically, our study states are distributed across the five U.S. regions (as 
shown by Figure 1): West (WA, OR, NV, UT, CO), Southwest (AZ), Midwest (IA, WI), 
Southeast (FL, NC, KY, WV), and Northeast (MD, NY, NJ, RI, MA) with Southwest and 
Midwest slightly under-represented.  
When examining individual regulations, we observe some variation except in 
AWP/FOC laws. Table 2 shows that among all 17 states, five are non-CON states (AZ, 
CO, OR, UT and WI). Five states have community benefit requirement regulations (MA, 
MD, NY, RI and UT)§§§, and eight states fund an uncompensated care pool (AZ, CO, 
MA, MD, NJ, NV, NY and WV).  Additional evidence for variations in policy 
interactions can be found in Appendix A. 
                                                 
 
 
§§§ NC and NV enacted community benefit requirement laws in 2005. 
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Figure 1: Study States vs. Non-study States 
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Table 2: Variations of Regulations by Study States  
 
States CON REQUIREMENT POOL CONVERSION AWP/FOC 
Arizona   X X  
Colorado   X X  
Florida X     
Iowa X     
Kentucky X    X 
Maryland X X X X  
Massachusetts X X X   
Nevada X X X   
New Jersey X  X   
New York X X X   
North Carolina X X    
Oregon† X   X  
Rhode Island X X  X  
Utah  X    
Washington X   X  
West Virginia X  X   
Wisconsin† X    X 
      
Total  12 7 8 6 2 
   † Long-term care facility only 
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The HCUP SID data assign a unique data source hospital identifier which can be 
matched with the AHA identifier provided by a link file in the HCUP SID data. The 
AHA identifier then serves as the distinguishing identifier in the linked dataset, which 
uses the AHA data for information on hospital characteristics such as hospital size and 
ownership status. Data from the Area Resource Files on market and community 
characteristics are merged using county codes. 
The sample for this study consists of hospital-level data for nonfederal, short-term, 
general hospitals in the 17 states. All specialty, psychiatric, and long-term care hospitals 
are excluded. The original dataset for analysis comprised 4,324 hospital-years for the 
study period 2002-2004. This excludes 2004 data for Utah and New York as these states 
did not report to the HCUP for those years. After hospitals with only one year of 
observations are excluded, we are left with a study sample of 2,625 nonprofit and 500 
for-profit hospital-year observations. In the nonprofit sample, about 78 percent (779 
hospitals) have all three years of observations and the remaining 22 percent (204 
hospitals) have two years of observations. In the for-profit sample, about 84 percent (148 
hospitals) have three years of observations and the remaining 16 percent (28 hospitals) 
have two years of observations. In addition, we have missing values on two important 
control variables, the technology intensity variable and the ER variable measuring 
whether a hospital has an emergency department. We imputed values for the technology 
intensity variable for 2002, the year we have missing values. Our final sample therefore 
contains 2,322 nonprofit and 295 for-profit observations. In our final sample, 76 percent 
(613 nonprofit hospitals) and 24 percent (198 nonprofit hospitals) have three and two 
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years of observations respectively. 48 percent (57 for-profit hospitals) and 52 percent (62 
for-profit hospitals) have three and two years of observations respectively.   
We carefully examined whether there might be sample selection bias due to our 
choice of the states as well as to the pattern of the missing values. Since it is reasonable 
to assume that a state’s decision to participate in HCUP reporting during certain time 
periods is independent of hospital supply of uncompensated care, we are confident that 
states are excluded randomly.  
We also lost a significant number of observations due to missing values on the 
technology intensity and ER variable. Table 3.1 shows that none of the hospitals in our 
study states reported on the technology intensity variable in 2002. The remaining 
states/years have missing values that range from 1% to 42%. In 2003 and 2004, those 
hospitals that did not respond to the technology intensity variable did not respond to the 
ER variable, either.  Most hospitals reported on the ER variable in 2002 (Table 3.2). In 
order to utilize the 2002 data, we imputed values for the 2002 technology intensity 
variable. We replaced missing values on this variable in 2002 by values the same 
hospitals reported in 2003, assuming that the number of hi-tech services did not change 
from 2002 to 2003 for these hospitals. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine 
whenever our results are significantly affected by excluding/including these two variables.  
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Table 3.1: Percent of Missing Values for Technology Intensity by State/Year 
State   2002 2003 2004 
Arizona X 26% 24% 
Colorado X 22% 13% 
Florida X 27% 29% 
Iowa X 0 0 
Kentucky X 5% 19% 
Maryland X 0 4% 
Massachusetts X 0 1% 
Nevada X 27% 42% 
New Jersey X 13% 13% 
New York X 24% N/A 
North Carolina X 15% 14% 
Oregon X 0 0 
Rhode Island X 20% 20% 
Utah X 13% N/A 
Washington X 15% 22% 
West Virginia X 0 0 
Wisconsin X 2% 7% 
 
 
Table 3.2: Percent of Missing Values for ER by State/Year 
State   2002 2003 2004 
Arizona 22% 26% 24% 
Colorado 21% 22% 13% 
Florida 33% 27% 29% 
Iowa 0 0 0 
Kentucky 13% 5% 19% 
Maryland 9% 0 4% 
Massachusetts 1% 0 1% 
Nevada 23% 27% 42% 
New Jersey 6% 13% 13% 
New York 25% 24% N/A 
North Carolina 17% 15% 14% 
Oregon 3% 0 0 
Rhode Island 10% 20% 20% 
Utah 18% 13% N/A 
Washington 12% 15% 22% 
West Virginia 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 7% 2% 7% 
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Dependent Variable 
Uncompensated care is widely used to capture hospital provision of care to the 
uninsured. In many prior studies, it is measured as charity care and bad debt. Charity care 
includes care provided to the indigent who are not expected to pay, whereas bad debt is 
accrued by someone who is expected to pay but does not pay at all or fails to pay the full 
amount of their medical bills. There are three problems with this definition. Some 
scholars argue that including bad debt as part of the measure would overstate a hospital’s 
uncompensated care provision. This is because the amount of bad debt also reflects a 
hospital’s debt collection efforts (Gaskin 1997; Thorpe, Florence et al. 2000; Rosko 
2004). For example, Gaskin (1997) argues that the implementation of an uncompensated 
care pool in Massachusetts could potentially create a moral hazard problem in that the 
pool reduced the marginal cost of debt collection. As a result, without proper monitoring 
of the hospitals’ debt collection efforts, their bad debt portion of the uncompensated care 
could increase in response to the Trust Fund.  A second disadvantage of lumping charity 
care and bad debt under the same uncompensated care umbrella is that the distinction 
between charity care and bad debt is unclear. Some hospitals use a formal process in 
advance of billing to identify those who are unable to pay, while others use the billing 
and collection process. Consequently, care delivered to patients may be classified as 
charity care by one hospital but bad debt by another (AHA 2005). Lastly, using 
uncompensated care data for comparisons among different types of hospitals or hospitals 
with mixed payer types can be problematic because uncompensated care data, generally 
expressed as charges, are usually sensitive to different hospital accounting practices 
(AHA 2005).  Despite these concerns, studies continue to use both charity care and bad 
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debt to measure hospital provision of uncompensated care due to the fact that existing 
data sets do not make meaningful distinctions between the two concepts (Rundall, Sofaer 
et al. 1988).   
We improve upon measures of uncompensated care used in previous studies by 
focusing on the actual hospital services delivered to the uninsured. In our analysis, 
uncompensated care is measured as number/percent of admissions per hospital that are 
for the uninsured. This dependent variable is constructed as (1) number of all admissions 
for self-pay/charity patients in a hospital; (2) percent of admissions for self-pay/charity 
patients by dividing the number of admissions for self-pay and charity patients in a 
hospital by all the admissions in that hospital. Although this measure could slightly 
overstate the amount of hospital care that is indeed uncompensated since some of these 
uninsured patients may pay in-part or in-full and some may qualify for coverage after 
they have been admitted, this still represents an improvement over previous measures for 
the following reasons. Our measure directly captures care provided to the uninsured. 
Therefore, it represents a better indicator of access to care for the uninsured than financial 
measures of uncompensated care. In addition, it is not influenced by individual hospital 
accounting practices. As argued by Gruber (1994), changes in uncompensated care 
measured as charges may not be directly interpretable as changes in the level of care 
delivered to the uninsured because these changes in charges are likely to reflect shifts in 
hospital pricing policy and debt collection efforts.  
One earlier study that used the same measure to capture hospitals services to the 
uninsured, Frank and Salkever (1991), developed a theoretical model of indigent care 
supply by nonprofit hospitals. They tested the model using 40 nonprofit general hospitals 
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in Maryland during the period of 1980-1984. Three regression analyses were conducted 
with three different dependent variables: the number of equivalent admissions accounted 
for by uncompensated care in the hospital (calculated by dividing the dollar amount of 
uncompensated care by the hospital’s gross inpatient revenue per admission), the same 
measure adjusted by case-mix costliness, and number of discharges of inpatients 
classified at admission as either self-pay or charity cases. Their study found few 
differences across the three measures, which provides validation for our alternative 
measure of uncompensated care.  
Regulatory Variables 
The literature on regulations suggests that variations in regulatory intensity affect 
the financial resources of hospitals and hence have direct and indirect effects on hospital 
responses to their regulatory environment (Cook, Shortell et al. 1983). Cook, Shortell et 
al. (1983) also argue that dimensions of regulations, such as scope, restrictiveness, 
uncertainty, and duration, need to be considered when examining regulatory impacts.  We 
therefore include these specific dimensions proposed by Cook et al. in our regulatory 
measures to capture the intensity of the regulations.  
 Researchers argue that the structure and scope of CON regulations have led to 
variations in the effectiveness of this program (Salkever 2000). Variables such as dollar 
thresholds and scope of services are indicative of intensity variations of CON programs 
with lower dollar thresholds and broader scope of control predictive of stricter regulatory 
control. We therefore adopt the index developed by the American Health Planning 
Association (2005) to measure the presence and intensity of CON programs. This index is 
constructed as a weighted number of covered services, with the weights capturing the 
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review thresholds**** of different CON programs. Specifically, state CON programs are 
first weighted by their capital, equipment and new service review dollar thresholds. 
Assigning a weight to each state’s CON programs represents a way to reflect the 
restrictiveness of the program.  These weights are then multiplied by the number of 
services, which captures the scope of the program, to obtain the intensity index. States 
with a higher index have more restrictive CON control, while states without CON 
programs are assigned a score of zero.  Although this index has been adopted by many 
earlier studies, it has some limitations. This index does not reflect the duration of the 
program, which is argued to affect the intensity of the programs. However, this will not 
affect our estimates because all the study states adopted their CON regulation in the late 
1960s or early 1970s. Another problem with this index, as is true with all indices, is the 
assumption that each unit on the intensity scale exerts the same impact on the dependent 
variable, which tends to limit our interpretation of marginal effects. However, our ability 
to determine the direction of the impacts is not compromised by this problem.   
POOL is an interval level variable measuring variations of the restrictiveness of 
state uncompensated care pool regulations. States without a pool regulation are assigned 
a value of zero, states with a voluntary pool regulation, such as West Virginia and 
Nevada, are accorded a value of one, and states with mandatory pools are assigned a 
value of two.  
                                                 
 
 
**** Review threshold refers to the threshold for expenditure of the new service/capital/equipment that 
exceeds certain dollar amount. Hospital expenditures have to be reviewed if they exceed a certain 
threshold.  
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REQUIREMENT represents an index that takes values of zero, one, two and three. 
It captures the duration, restrictiveness and scope of community benefit requirement laws. 
Duration is measured by the length of time community benefit requirement laws have 
been in effect. Consistent with Ginn and Moseley (2006) and given our study period, we 
argue that laws that are proposed and implemented before year 2000 are more mature,  
have a longer duration and stronger impact than laws that were instituted after year 2000. 
We measure restrictiveness by whether community benefit requirement laws are 
mandatory or voluntary. Some states such as Massachusetts have laws that are largely 
voluntary, making them less restrictive than those that are mandatory. Lastly, we posit 
that laws that are broader in scope, such as those mandating both public reporting of 
community benefits and a specific percentage of hospital net patient revenues be devoted 
to charity care, are more intense than laws that require either public reporting or a 
proportionate amount of contribution.  The index is developed by summing the numbers 
across three dimensions (see Table 4). States without community benefit requirement 
laws are assigned a value of zero. By construction, a state with a voluntary community 
benefit requirement law implemented prior to 2000 and with either public reporting or a 
percent requirement would also assume a value of zero, which makes it indistinguishable 
from states without such a regulation. This, however, is not a concern for the current 
study because none of our study states fits the above profile.    
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Table 4: Intensity Index: Dimensions for Community Benefit Requirement 
Laws 
Dimensions Duration Restrictiveness Scope 
Before 2000  
After 2000 
0 
1 
  
Voluntary  
Mandatory  
 0 
1 
 
Public Reporting OR 
Percentage Requirement 
Public Reporting AND 
Percentage Requirement 
  0 
 
1 
 
We also create interactions of regulatory variables to test if there are any 
interaction effects among different regulatory programs. We test nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals in separate models, as suggested by previous literatures as well as the 
theoretical framework.  We exclude AWP/FOC and state conversion laws from our final 
analysis due to a lack of variation on both regulations. Only two states (KY and WI) have 
AWP/FOC laws. Although six states have conversion regulations, limited information on 
regulatory intensity prohibits us from separating the effects of locating in a given state (or 
states effects) from the effects of state conversion regulations.    
Control Variables 
We control for a series of hospital characteristics that could affect its capacity to 
provide uncompensated care. To be consistent with other studies of hospital 
uncompensated care provision, we controlled for teaching status, the number of high-
technology services offered by the hospital, hospital size, public hospital, whether a 
hospital has an emergency department, and hospital system/network membership. These 
variables are all extracted from the AHA (2002, 2003, and 2004) data.  
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We include hospital teaching status coded one as teaching and zero otherwise to 
capture uncompensated care provision by teaching hospitals. We define a teaching 
hospital as one approved to participate in residency training by the Accreditation Council 
for Graduate Medical Education, affiliated with a medical school, or a member of the 
Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH). Studies have shown that teaching hospitals bear 
a disproportionate share of the uncompensated care burden. In their five-state analysis of 
uncompensated care distribution among U.S. hospitals, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) found that major teaching hospitals accounted for a large percentage of the total 
uncompensated care cost compared with other nonprofit or for-profit hospitals (GAO 
2006). We hence expect that hospital teaching status is positively associated with 
uncompensated care provision.  
Following previous studies, we also control for hospital characteristics that would 
affect the shape of the cost curve. Such measures include technology intensity, hospital 
size, and whether the hospital has an emergency department. Since larger and more 
technology-intense hospitals have more capacity to provide uncompensated care, we 
expect that hospital size (as measured by number of beds), technology intensity (as 
measured by the number of high-technology services offered by the hospital in the 
following areas: neonatal intensive care, open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, CT 
and Positron Emission Tomography or PET††††), are positively related to uncompensated 
                                                 
 
 
†††† As suggested by previous studies, Dranove, D. and M. Shanley (1995). "Cost Reductions or Reputation 
Enhancement as Motives for Mergers: the Logic of Multihosipital Systems." Strategic Management Journal 
16(1): 55-74, Davidoff, A. J., A. T. LoSasso, et al. (2000). "The effect of changing state health policy on 
hospital uncompensated care." Inquiry 37(3): 253-67, Bazzoli, G. J., R. C. Lindrooth, et al. (2006). "The 
influence of health policy and market factors on the hospital safety net." Health Serv Res 41(4 Pt 1): 1159-
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care provision. Whether a hospital has an emergency department is a dummy variable 
measure indicating the presence of an ER. Since hospitals with an ER are more likely to 
encounter uninsured patients (given that the uninsured often wait to seek care until 
symptoms worsen), we expect that having an emergency department is also positively 
associated with uncompensated care provision.  
Research suggests that multiunit system affiliations promote hospital provision of 
community benefits including uncompensated care (Proenca, Rosko et al. 2000; Lee, 
Alexander et al. 2003). This is because, on the one hand, hospitals belonging to a 
system/network have more resources or excess capacity to deal with exogenous pressures, 
such as financial stress from various cost containment efforts, without compromising 
their community orientation (Cook, Shortell et al. 1983). On the other hand, institutional 
theory indicates that larger organizations attract more attention and therefore may be 
under more pressure to conform to community expectations (Rosko 2004). We therefore 
expect that the network/system affiliation be positively related to hospital uncompensated 
care provision. Because we have missing values for 51 percent of the hospital-years, we 
replace the network dummy variable with the prevalence of a network/system (measured 
as percent of hospitals that belong to a network/system in the market). We hypothesize 
that this variable will be positively associated with uncompensated care provision, given 
that network/system hospitals tend to provide more uncompensated care than non-
network/system hospitals.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
80.), these services tend to require higher technological investment and hence represent a good measure of 
technological sophistication.  
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We also control for major market area characteristics that affect hospital provision 
of uncompensated care. A growing body of literature suggests that the level of hospital 
competition and health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration greatly influence 
hospitals’ ability to provide uncompensated care (Gruber 1994; Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 
2006). Price shopping and cost control strategies adopted by managed care organizations 
have increased price competition among hospitals. As market competition intensifies, 
nonprofit hospitals’ ability to cross-subsidize uncompensated care decreases. However, 
such care becomes more attractive for for-profit hospitals because the opportunity cost of 
providing uncompensated care decreases. We therefore expect to see different behavioral 
responses from hospitals of different ownerships in markets with various levels of HMO 
penetration and market competition. We also include an interaction term between HMO 
penetration and market competition to test if there are any interaction effects. As 
suggested by previous studies, in markets where competition is already intense, HMO 
penetration could reduce nonprofit hospitals’ capacity to provide uncompensated care 
even further by shrinking their paying patient base (Mann, Melnick et al. 1997; Davidoff, 
LoSasso et al. 2000).  In addition, Davidoff et al. (2000) found that although market 
competition has no effect on nonprofit hospitals at any level of HMO penetration, for-
profit hospitals show a negative effect of competition on uncompensated care at all but 
the highest level of penetration.  
The key issue in measuring market competition and HMO penetration is defining 
the appropriate hospital market area. Prior research suggests a number of ways to define 
relevant hospital markets. Some studies choose geographic measures such as counties, 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), or Health Service Areas (HSAs) (Dranove, 
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Shanley et al. 1992; Gaynor and Vogt 2000). Other studies define a fixed or variable 
radius from each hospital as the relevant market area (Luft, Robinson et al. 1986; Gresenz, 
Rogowski et al. 2004). Although these measures have the advantage of computational 
ease, they are often considered to be arbitrary and sometimes underestimate the amount 
of competition facing a hospital (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Another commonly used 
method is to examine patient flows and define markets as consisting of geographic areas 
(typically zip codes) that send a nontrivial number of patients to a given hospital. This 
approach overcomes the disadvantages inherited in previous measures. However, using 
patient flows has the potential for endogeneity bias when used to investigate the effects of 
competition on hospital cost and quality (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Given the relative 
merits and drawbacks of each approach, the current study defines hospital markets using 
an exogenous measure - counties and a potential endogenous measure - patient flows 
(please see Appendix B for a detailed account of this construction).  We performed a 
sensitivity analysis to select a superior measure between markets defined by counties and 
markets defined by patient flows. The test did not, however, reveal significant differences 
between these two measures (see Appendix C for detailed results from the sensitivity 
analysis). We therefore use the market measure defined by patient flows in our final 
analysis to avoid the arbitrariness of the county measure.   
Once the relevant geographic market is defined, we are able to control for the 
market competition by computing a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) using hospital 
market shares. HHI is a commonly used index to measure the degree of competition in a 
given market area. It is derived by summing the squared market shares of each hospital in 
the relevant market area:  
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where iS  is the percentage of hospital beds the 
thi hospital has. HHI ranges from 
0 to 10,000 with 10,000 representing a monopoly and 0 being a hospital in a near 
perfectly competitive market. As HHI increases, the competitiveness in the market 
decreases. The U.S. Department of Justice (1992) considers a market with a HHI of less 
than 1,000 to be a competitive marketplace. This index is calculated for each year, using 
the full sample of hospitals. It is then rescaled to a range of 0 to 1.  
HMO penetration is measured by the percentage of county population enrolled in 
HMOs in 1998. This measure was extracted from the 2005 ARF data. Unfortunately, this 
dataset does not give us access to the updated numbers for our study period. Since studies 
have suggested an increasing trend for managed care enrollment (Bian and Morrisey 
2006), we expect that our measure will likely underestimate the effect of managed care 
organizations on the level of uncompensated care provision.   
Socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community also affect hospital 
provision of uncompensated care. The demand for uncompensated care is much greater in 
communities with a large number of uninsured, lower income individuals and lower 
percentage of elderly population. We therefore control for insurance coverage, per capita 
income and percentage of population aged 65 or above. We obtain insurance coverage 
information from the 2000 Census Small Area Health Insurance Estimates for Counties 
and States (SAHIE). This measure is calculated as the percentage of county population 
without health insurance. We generate comparable numbers for markets defined by 
patient flows. However, with the steadily growing number of uninsured over the years, 
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our year 2000 data will likely understate the demand for uncompensated care due to lack 
of insurance. Per capita income for county markets is calculated by dividing the total 
income by county population for each year. The same measure for markets based on 
patient flows is calculated by adding all the income by market groups and total 
population by market groups respectively, and then dividing total income by market 
groups by total population by market groups. We use 2003 per capita income to replace 
the 2004 numbers as the 2004 data are not available from the 2005 ARF. Percent of 
population over age 65 is calculated using similar method for both county markets and 
markets based on patient flows. As we only have the 2002 data on this variable, we use 
the 2002 numbers for 2003 and 2004. We do expect that percentage of population over 65 
is relatively stable over these three years.    
We also control for whether a hospital is located in rural or urban areas. We 
define rural/urban status using the Department of Agriculture’s rural-urban continuum 
codes for metro and non-metro counties provided by the ARF data. These codes range 
from one to nine, with one representing metro areas with a million population or more 
and nine being completely rural with less than 2,500 urban population, and not adjacent 
to a metro area.  Appendix D provides a complete list of rural-urban continuum codes.  
Tables 5 presents the independent variables and the expected sign of their effects 
on uncompensated care based on the above discussion. 
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Table 5: Predicted Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision 
 Uncompensated Care 
Variables Nonprofit For-profit 
Regulatory Measures   
CON + +/- 
POOL + + 
REQUIREMENT + +/- 
CON*POOL + +/- 
CON* REQUIREMENT +/- +/- 
POOL*REQUIREMENT +/- +/- 
CON*POOL* REQUIREMENT +/- +/- 
   
Hospital Characteristics   
Teaching hospital status + + 
Proportion public hospital  - - 
Technology intensity + + 
Hospital size + + 
ER + + 
Proportion network/system - - 
   
Market Characteristics   
HHI + - 
HMO penetration - + 
Percentage of population aged 65 or 
above 
- - 
Per capita income - - 
Percentage of population that are 
uninsured 
+ + 
Rural - - 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 defines each variable and Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for 
our full sample. These data represent means across three years, treating each hospital-
year combination as a separate observation.  
Over the three year period, our full sample has 4,324 hospital-year observations, 
which includes 1,552 hospitals in 2002, 1,508 hospitals in 2003, as well as 1,264 
hospitals in 2004. The figures show that, for example, in 2003, there are about 69% 
nonprofit hospitals in our sample, as compared to 62 percent nationally; 19% public 
hospitals, as compared to 20% nationally; and 12 percent for-profit hospitals, as 
compared to 18 percent nationally. We slightly over-sampled nonprofit hospitals and 
under-sampled for-profit hospitals. For all hospital-year observations, we have about 19 
percent public hospitals, 70 percent nonprofits and 11 percent for-profit hospitals, with 
nonprofit hospitals slightly over-represented.  Also note that public hospitals are included 
in the full sample for the purpose of comparison among different types of hospitals. They 
are however excluded from the analytical sample because we use percent of public 
hospitals in the market as a control variable.   
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Table 6: Variables and Their Definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Selfpay/Charity Number of admissions that are for self-pay/charity care patients 
Percent Selfpay/Charity Percentage of admissions that are for self-pay/charity care patients 
  
Regulatory Measures  
CON Certificate of Need 
REQUIREMENT Community benefit requirement 
POOL Uncompensated care pool 
  
Hospital Characteristics  
Teaching hospital status Dummy variable representing teaching hospital status 
Public Hospital_county Proportion of public hospitals in the market (by counties) 
Public Hospital_market Proportion of public hospitals in the market (by patient flows) 
Technology intensity Number of hi-tech services offered 
Hospital size Hospital bed size 
ER Dummy variable indicating whether a hospital has an Emergency Department 
Network/system_county Proportion of system/network members in markets defined by counties 
Network/system_market Proportion of system/network members in markets defined by patient flows 
  
Market Characteristics  
HHI_county Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on county) 
HHI_market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on patient flows) 
HMO penetration_county Proportion of population in the market (based on county) enrolled in HMO 
HMO penetration_market Proportion of population in the market (based on patient flows)enrolled in HMO 
Percentage of population 65+_county Percentage of population aged 65 or above 
Percentage of population 65+_market Percentage of population aged 65 or above 
Per capita income_county Per capita income (1,000) 
Per capita income_market Per capita income (1,000) 
Percent uninsured_county Percentage of population that are uninsured 
Percent uninsured_market Percentage of population that are uninsured 
Rural Rural/Urban continuum 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Selfpay/Charity 4324 443.37 805.14 0 14215 
Percent Selfpay/Charity 4324 5 6 0 100‡‡‡‡ 
      
Regulatory Measures      
CON 4324 9.31 6.64 0 21.60 
REQUIREMENT 4324 0.35 0.75 0 3 
POOL 4324 0.70 0.93 0 2 
      
Hospital Characteristics      
Teaching hospital status 4324 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Public Hospital_county 4324 3 8 0 29 
Public Hospital_market 4324 3 6 0 76 
Technology intensity 2385 2.10 1.41 0 5 
Hospital size 4324 220.99 265.32 0§§§§ 2163 
ER 3706 0.98 0.13 0 1 
Network/system_county 4324 10 39 0 87 
Network/system_market 4324 10 30 0 41 
      
Market Characteristics      
HHI_county 4324 0.50 0.35 0 1 
HHI_market 4324 0.31 0.29 0.05 1 
HMO penetration_county 4324 0.25 0.18 3.8 0.96 
HMO penetration_market 4324 0.28 0.17 0 0.96 
Percentage of population 65+_county 4324 14 4 6.54 34 
Percentage of population 65+_market 4324 13.97 3.94 6.53 34.24 
Per capita income_county 4324 29.64 9.51 14.80 84.59 
Per capita income_market 4324 30.63 9.03 14.80 84.59 
Percent uninsured_county 4324 13.65 4.12 5.4 29.50 
Percent uninsured_market 4324 13.44 3.77 13.52 25.70 
Rural 4324 3.24 2.41 1 9 
                                                 
 
 
‡‡‡‡ A nonprofit hospital that is excluded later in the analysis because of possible reporting error from the 
hospital.   
§§§§ A public hospital that reported zero beds. Public hospitals are excluded in the analysis.  
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The next set of tables (Tables 8.1 – 8.3) report full sample summary statistics by 
hospital status: public, nonprofit, and for-profit. It shows that on average, a slightly 
higher percentage (6%) of admissions in public and for-profit hospitals are for the 
uninsured patients than those in nonprofit hospitals (5%). Figure 2 and 3 further illustrate 
the distribution of total number of admissions for the uninsured by ownership types in 
2002. This pattern remains largely unchanged for 2003 and 2004 (Appendix E).  In the 
aggregate, nonprofit hospitals consistently have the most uninsured admissions (68-70 
percent) compared with public (11-14 percent) and for-profit hospitals (16-21 percent).  
This is partly because the majority of U.S. hospitals are nonprofits.  
The summary tables also show that on average, nonprofit hospitals tend to be 
larger (as measured in number of beds) and are more technologically sophisticated than 
public or for-profit hospitals.  
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status 
(Public) 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Number of Self-pay/Charity  826 495.77 1350.11 0 14215 
Percent of Self-pay/Charity 826 6 7 0 71 
      
CON 826 9.92 6.21 0 21.6 
REQUIREMENT 826 0.16 0.57 0 3 
POOL 826 0.42 0.77 0 2 
      
Teaching hospital status 826 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Technology intensity 461 1.58 1.27 0 5 
Hospital size 826 143.69 224.77 0 1839 
ER 715 0.98 0.13 0 1 
Network/system_county 826 5 15 0 36 
Network/system_market 826 6 21 0 41 
      
HHI_county 826 0.64 0.36 0.05 1 
HHI_market 826 0.36 0.33 0.03 1 
HMO penetration_county 826 0.13 0.13 0 0.66 
HMO penetration_market 826 0.21 0.15 0 0.66 
Percentage of population 65+_county 826 15 4 7 30 
Percentage of population 65+_market 826 13.92 3.58 6.54 31.58 
Per capita income_county 826 26.52 7.71 14.30 84.59 
Per capita income_market 826 28.90 8.04 16.05 84.59 
Percent uninsured_county 826 14.80 4.54 4.4 26.9 
Percent uninsured_market 826 14.11 4.21 5.5 24.76 
Rural 826 4.85 2.57 1 9 
2002 826 0.35 0.48 0 1 
2003 826 0.34 0.47 0 1 
2004 826 0.31 0.46 0 1 
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Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status 
(Nonprofit) 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Number of Self-pay/Charity  2962 434.68 636.01 0 5844 
Percent of Self-pay/Charity 2962 5 5 0 100 
      
CON 2962 9.50 6.81 0 21.6 
REQUIREMENT 2962 0.44 0.78 0 3 
POOL 2962 0.83 0.97 0 2 
      
Teaching hospital status 2962 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Public Hospital_county 2962 1 7 0 29.4 
Public Hospital_market 2962 2 6 0 76 
Technology intensity 1674 2.26 1.44 0 5 
Hospital size 2962 251.38 288.31 6 2163 
ER 2634 0.99 0.12 0 1 
Network/system_county 2962 13 46 0 87 
Network/system_market 2962 12 34 0 41 
      
HHI_county 2962 0.48 0.34 0.05 1 
HHI_market 2962 0.30 0.28 0.03 1 
HMO penetration_county 2962 0.27 0.18 0 0.96 
HMO penetration_market 2962 0.30 0.17 0 0.96 
Percentage of population 65+_county 2962 14 4 0.03 0.34 
Percentage of population 65+_market 2962 13.69 3.48 7.15 34.24 
Per capita income_county 2962 30.64 10.12 14.80 84.59 
Per capita income_market 2962 31.35 9.62 14.80 84.59 
Percent uninsured_county 2962 13.01 3.97 3.8 29.5 
Percent uninsured_market 2962 12.89 3.59 5.4 25.7 
Rural 2962 2.94 2.25 1 9 
2002 2962 0.37 0.48 0 1 
2003 2962 0.35 0.48 0 1 
2004 2962 0.28 0.45 0 1 
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Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status 
(For-profit) 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Number of Self-pay/Charity  536 410.70 427.47 0 4070 
Percent of Self-pay/Charity 536 6 6 0 55 
      
CON 536 7.35 5.95 0 20.7 
REQUIREMENT 536 0.19 0.68 0 3 
POOL 536 0.44 0.76 0 2 
      
Teaching hospital status 536 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Public Hospital_county 536 1 0.02 0 12 
Public Hospital_market 536 1 0.02 0 9 
Technology intensity 250 2.02 1.19 0 5 
Hospital size 536 172.18 118.89 6 655 
ER 357 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Network/system_county 536 4 0.10 0 84 
Network/system_market 536 4 0.07 0 49 
      
HHI_county 536 0.40 0.33 0.05 1 
HHI_market 536 0.24 0.24 0.03 1 
HMO penetration_county 536 0.29 0.19 0 0.64 
HMO penetration_market 536 0.30 0.18 0.01 0.61 
Percentage of population 65+_county 536 15 6 4 34 
Percentage of population 65+_market 536 15.55 5.97 8.15 34.24 
Per capita income_county 536 28.93 7.14 13.52 49.54 
Per capita income_market 536 29.28 6.12 17.56 49.54 
Percent uninsured_county 536 15.39 3.33 6.5 25.3 
Percent uninsured_market 536 15.44 3.16 8.27 24.76 
Rural 536 2.43 1.88 1 9 
2002 536 0.33 0.47 0 1 
2003 536 0.34 0.47 0 1 
2004 536 0.34 0.47 0 1 
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Figure 2: Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 2002 
 
 
Figure 3: Percent of Uncompensated Care Admissions by Ownership Types 
2002 
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 Table 9 presents summary statistics for the final study sample by nonprofit/for-
profit status, after all the missing values for technology intensity variable and ER variable 
are excluded. This sample has 2,235 nonprofit observations and 295 for-profit 
observations that are representative of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals of all sizes in the 
U.S.  Table 10 compares hospitals in our study sample in 2003 with those nationally with 
regard to size (as measured in number of beds) and location (as indicated by rural/urban). 
Our two-sample paired t test fails to find any significant differences between the study 
sample and national statistics, indicating that our nonprofit and for-profit samples mirror 
the U.S. hospitals of all sizes and in rural/urban areas (test results are reported in 
Appendix F). Additionally, the summary statistics are not significantly different from the 
full sample statistics. Nonprofit hospitals are still found to provide, on average, a higher 
volume of admissions for the uninsured but a slightly lower percentage than their for-
profit counterparts. They tend to be larger, more technologically sophisticated and more 
likely to have an Emergency Department.  
We further examined the regulatory variations by ownership status. Tables 11.1 – 
11.3 and 12.1 – 12.3 represent intensity variations of each regulation across all hospitals 
by ownership types. In the nonprofit sample, 28.9 percent of the hospitals are located in 
non-CON states and the remaining 71.1 percent in states with CON of varying intensities. 
74.5 percent of the nonprofit hospitals are in states without a community benefit 
requirement regulation.  More than half of the nonprofit hospitals are found in states that 
do not have an uncompensated care pool. In the for-profit sample, 20.7 percent of the 
hospitals are located in non-CON states. 88.1 percent of the for-profit hospitals are in 
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states without a community benefit requirement regulation. 71 percent of the for-profit 
hospitals are found in states without an uncompensated care pool.  
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the Final Study Sample by Nonprofit/For-profit 
Status  
 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
         
Number of Self-pay/Charity  476.98 705.25 0 9370 395.11 346.24 0 1613 
Percent of Self-pay/Charity 4.62 4.90 0 100 5.19 3.94 0 25.66 
         
CON 8.91 7.01 0 20.7 7.90 6.53 0 20.7 
REQUIREMENT 0.39 0.74 0 3 0.26 0.78 0 3 
POOL 0.80 0.95 0 2 0.45 0.75 0 2 
         
Teaching hospital status 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Public Hospital_county 0.90 2.78 0 19.63 0.75 2.10 0 12.22 
Public Hospital_market 1.51 2.61 0 19.63 1.34 2.05 0 8.83 
Technology intensity 2.15 1.37 0 5.00 2.11 1.18 0 5.00 
Hospital size 216.86 215.09 6 2163 159.02 104.71 6 655 
ER 0.99 0.12 0 1 0.97 0.18 0 1 
Network/system_county 9.50 15.80 0 109.90 5.21 11.23 0 84.39 
Network/system_market 9.36 12.78 0 90.91 4.70 8.12 0 49.07 
         
HHI_county 0.52 0.34 0.05 1 0.44 0.32 0.05 1 
HHI_market 0.32 0.30 0.03 1 0.26 0.24 0.03 1 
HMO penetration_county 0.26 0.18 0 0.8 0.27 0.19 0.01 0.64 
HMO penetration_market 0.29 0.18 0 0.8 0.29 0.18 0.01 0.61 
Percentage of population 65+_county 13.84 3.62 3.00 32.02 15.50 6.00 6.40 33.77 
Percentage of population 65+_market 13.70 3.34 7.15 34.24 15.94 6.28 8.15 34.24 
Per capita income_county 30.26 9.22 14.80 84.59 28.45 6.91 17.56 47.45 
Per capita income_market 30.98 8.66 14.80 84.59 28.83 6.05 17.56 44.12 
Percent uninsured_county 12.70 3.93 3.8 29.5 14.85 3.11 7.8 23.5 
Percent uninsured_market 12.60 3.48 5.4 25.3 14.97 2.98 8.90 23.32 
Rural 3.09 2.29 1 9 2.56 1.87 1 9 
2002 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
2003 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 
2004 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.29 0.46 0 1 
 2235 295 
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Table 10: Comparing Hospitals in Final Study Sample and in U.S. in 2003 
   Sample U.S. 
Nonprofit  Percent of beds 0-49 17% 23% 
  50-99 16% 19% 
  100-199 25% 24% 
  200-399 27% 25% 
  >=400 15% 9% 
 Percent of 
urban 
 67% 62% 
 N  807 2,794 
For-profit Percent of beds 0-49 13% 22% 
  50-99 19% 20% 
  100-199 36% 34% 
  200-399 31% 20% 
  >=400 2% 4% 
 Percent of 
urban 
 74% 73% 
 N  118 667 
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Table 11.1: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity 
 
Certificate-of-Need (CON) 
CON Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 646 28.9 
3.5 21 0.94 
4.8 171 7.65 
6.3 151 6.76 
8.1 170 7.61 
12.1 167 7.47 
12.8 91 4.07 
14.4 128 5.73 
15 212 9.49 
15.2 23 1.03 
16 185 8.28 
18.4 177 7.92 
20.7 93 4.16 
   
Total 2,235 100 
 
Table 11.2: Community Benefit Requirement 
Community Benefit Requirement Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 1,665 74.5 
1 299 13.38 
2 235 10.51 
3 36 1.61 
   
Total 2,235 100 
 
Table 11.3: Uncompensated Care Pool 
Uncompensated Care Pool Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 1,280 57.27 
1 114 5.1 
2 841 37.63 
   
Total 2,235 100 
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Table 12.1: For-profit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity 
 
Certificate-of-Need (CON) 
CON Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 61 20.68 
3.5 9 3.05 
4.8 10 3.39 
6.3 136 46.1 
12.1 3 1.02 
12.8 7 2.37 
14.4 3 1.02 
15 2 0.68 
16 21 7.12 
18.4 14 4.75 
20.7 29 9.83 
   
Total 295 100 
 
Table 12.2: Community Benefit Requirement 
Community Benefit Requirement Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 260 88.14 
1 13 4.41 
2 2 0.68 
3 20 6.78 
   
Total 295 100 
 
Table 12.3: Uncompensated Care Pool 
Uncompensated Care Pool Intensity Index Freq. Percent 
   
0 210 71.19 
1 38 12.88 
2 47 15.93 
   
Total 295 100 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
Estimation 
We use panel data for our analysis because they present several advantages over 
cross section or time series data. Cross section data measure an observation at a point in 
time and time series data follows an observation across time, while panel data combine 
cross section and time series data. As a result, our sample size increases because an 
observation was repeatedly measured at different points in time. Additionally, since we 
follow the same cross section unit over time, we are able to obtain consistent estimators 
in the presence of omitted variables using proper panel data techniques.  
There is some concern that omitted variables might be a problem because some 
hospital characteristics might not be observable or measurable. In other words, there is a 
hospital specific latent variable iα as defined in the component error term itε :  
UCit = β0 + β1Hospitalit + β2Marketit + β3Regulationit+β4Year+ β5State+ itε  
where itiit ηαε += . This latent variable can be, for example, the preferences of hospital 
administrators/boards of trustees towards uncompensated care provision, or hospital 
managerial quality or structure that tend to be constant over time. Depending on whether 
this unobserved iα is correlated with some right-hand side hospital specific explanatory 
variables such as size, structure (i.e., whether the hospital maintains an emergency 
department) or technological sophistication, we test different estimation methods: pooled 
 77
Ordinary Least Squares or pooled OLS, random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS), 
and a Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) approach.  
 
Three Estimation Approaches: Pooled OLS, GLS and HTIV 
The general form of our empirical model can be expressed as  
ititit XY εβ +=        t=1, 2, 3         (1) 
itiit ηαε +=  
itε  is a composite error term which represents the sum of the unobserved effect 
and an idiosyncratic error. We first estimate our empirical model using a pooled OLS. 
The pooled OLS estimator requires no correlation between itX  and itε (i.e., E( itX ' itε )=0 
and E( itX ' iα )=0) to obtain a consistent estimator of β  in model (1). This estimator, 
however, ignores hospital specific unobserved effects.  
We then re-estimate the model using an improved estimation --- random effect 
GLS that controls for random hospital specific effects using variation over both time and 
cross sectional units to estimate the parameter β vector. In addition, it exploits the serial 
correlation in the composite error itiit ηαε +=  to produce more efficient estimators than 
pooled OLS or fixed effects. Similar to pooled OLS, it also requires orthogonality 
between  iα  and itX . In other words, both pooled OLS and random effects GLS rely on 
the assumption that unobservable hospital characteristics are not correlated with our 
right-hand side variables.  
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However, there is concern that such a correlation might exist. Some evidence 
suggests that the hospital industry, acting as a powerful interest group, is able to influence 
state policy making such as the adoption of CON regulations so that the hospitals can 
preserve a profitable patient mix or volume (Wendling and Werner 1980; Lanning, 
Morrisey et al. 1991).  Although such a concern might be legitimate, there is also 
evidence suggesting that a state’s adoption of such regulations is motivated by its concern 
over inefficiency or market failure in the system rather than pure interest group transfers 
(Cone and Dranove, 1986; Morrisey and Ohsfeldt, 1991). As previously discussed in the 
theory of regulation and hospital regulation in particular (Chapter 2), a state’s decision to 
adopt certain policies can be viewed as in the public interest. For example, CON approval 
by regulators is made contingent, through formal conditions or informal negotiation, 
upon the willingness of the hospital to provide services (e.g., uncompensated care) that 
are perceived by the regulators as in the public interest (Salkever, 2000).  Therefore, 
industry capture might not be a concern if adoption of these policies is intended to amend 
market failure and is meant to protect the public interest. However, if we allow for the 
possibility of interest group influence and relax the assumption of strict exogeneity, our 
regulations will be endogenous as they are correlated with the latent hospital 
characteristics iα . In other words, if the industry capture theory holds true, unobserved 
hospital motivations to lobby for regulations might influence the level of uncompensated 
care they ultimately provide (by the patient mix/volume they choose).  
To allow such a correlation, we re-estimate the empirical model with a Hausman-
Taylor instrumental variables procedure (HTIV) that relaxes the independence 
assumption by allowing unobservable hospital characteristics to be correlated with our 
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right-hand side variables. Some previous studies have used fixed effects to eliminate 
potential endogeneity resulting from this omitted latent variable problem. However, fixed 
effects estimation removes time constant variables, such as the regulatory variables in our 
model. As we only have recent years of hospital discharge data, the lack of variation in 
the regulatory variables over time will prohibit us from estimating their impact on 
hospital behaviors with fixed effects estimation. Fortunately, Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
proposed a model that conveniently solves the potential correlation between omitted 
variables and the explanatory variables but still allows us to estimate the effects of time 
constant variables of interest.  
In a Hausman-Taylor procedure, the general form of our empirical model can be 
expressed as:  
                itiitit ZXY εγβ ++= ,                   (1) 
itiit ηαε +=  
where i = 1 to N and, t = 1 to T; β and γ  are k and g vectors of coefficients associated 
with time varying ( itX ) and time-invariant ( iZ ) observable variables respectively. In our 
case, itX  will contain variables such as percentage of network/system in the market, 
percentage of public hospitals in the market, HHI, per capita income, uninsurance rate, 
teaching status, technology intensity, bed size, ER, HMO penetration, and percentage of 
population over 65, while matrix iZ  will include regulatory measures and state dummies.  
Intuitively the Hausman-Taylor procedure follows an instrumental variable 
approach.  It uses variables in the model as instruments for the endogenous time-invariant 
variables. This has the advantage over traditional instrumental variables methods in that it 
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does not rely on excluded exogenous instruments which are usually difficult to obtain. 
However, the Hausman-Taylor procedure does require a priori information: the ability to 
distinguish columns of X  and Z  which are asymptotically correlated with iα from 
those which are not. In our application, we have reason to believe that hospital 
characteristics such as technology intensity, size, and whether a hospital has an 
Emergency Department are influenced by the latent individual hospital effect. CON laws 
may also be correlated if we further assume that unobserved hospital motivation to lobby 
for CON also influences the level of uncompensated care they ultimately provide (by the 
patient mix/volume they choose). However, percent of network/system in the market, 
percent of public hospitals in the market, HHI, percentage of population that are 
uninsured, other regulations, state dummies, HMO and percent of population over 65 are 
not correlated. 
Once we distinguish the time-varying/time invariant, exogenous/endogenous 
variables, itX  and iZ  can be further partitioned as ),( 21 ititit xxX = and ),( 21 iii zzZ = , 
where 1itx  is a 11 k× time-varying exogenous vector, 2itx  a 21 k×  time-varying 
endogenous vector, 1iz a 11 g× time-invariant exogenous vector, and 2iz a 21 g× time-
invariant endogenous vector. A vector of deviations from means averaged over time vQ  
was used as part of the instruments to transform equation (1). Thus by construction, vQ  is 
orthogonal to any time-invariant vector of observations (i.e., 0=iv ZQ  and 0=ivQ α ). 
Unfortunately, since vQ is also orthogonal to iZ , which violates the requirement that 
instruments be correlated with all the endogenous variables, Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
added the columns of 1itx and 1iz so that we now have the matrix [ ]11 iitv ZXQ MM  as 
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instruments. However, one necessary condition for all the parameters in equation (1) to 
be identified is 21 gk ≥ , Recall that the vector with 11 k×  time-varying exogenous 
variables is 1itx which includes eight variables (per capita income, percent of 
network/system in the market, percent of public hospitals in the market, HHI, percentage 
of population that are uninsured, HMO, teaching, and percent of population over 65). The 
vector with 21 g× time-invariant endogenous variables is 2iz  that includes seven 
regulatory variables and their interactions (see Table Z). Thus our model is over-
identified ( 21 gk > ). However, some of the time varying exogenous variables have low 
variation across the study period, which prohibits the HTIV model from constructing 
strong internal instruments. Percent of public hospital and teaching have zero variation 
for about half of the study sample. In addition, all of the over time variation for variables 
HMO penetration, percent of population over 65 and percent uninsured comes from 
population adjustment, which further weakens the identification. Specifically, these 
variables are constructed in the following ways. For example, for the HMO penetration 
variable, we take the year when county level data on this variable are available and 
multiply it by the county population for each year to obtain the number of people enrolled 
in HMO plans each year. We then sum the total number of enrollees in the market 
defined by patient flows and divide it by the total population in that market for each study 
year. As a result, a small amount of within group or over time variation was introduced in 
the market level HMO penetration variable, which is used in the analysis. Although this 
is the best we can achieve with the existing county level data to obtain the market level 
HMO penetration, percent of population over 65, and uninsurance rate, we need to be 
cautious about the potential problems this manipulation could create.  The amount of the 
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variation created by our population adjustment is low and does not represent the true 
underlying changes in variable trends over time. Even though the real HMO penetration, 
percent of population over 65, and percent of population uninsured in different years 
would also reflect population changes, our adjustment yields variations that are not the 
same as having information on the changes in the real underlying variable.  As a result, 
the Hausman Taylor procedure will still use these variables as instruments despite their 
low over-time variation, but may not perform well: low variation could result in weak 
identification, and hence large standard errors. In addition, because not all three variables 
are affected by population growth trend in the same way, a new bias is introduced and 
creates a measurement error that may bias the Hausman Taylor estimates.   
Table 13: List of Time Varying/Invariant and Endogenous/exogenous Variables  
  Endogenous Exogenous 
Time Varying Variables 
(X) 
Emergency Department Percent network 
  technology intensity Percent of public hospital 
  hospital size Teaching  
    HHI 
    HMO penetration* 
    Percent over 65* 
    Per capita income 
    Percent uninsured* 
Time Invariant Variables 
(Z) 
CON  Rural 
  Pool   
  Requirement  
  CON*Pool  
  CON*Requirement  
  Pool*Requirement  
  All three    
*Within group variation represents population weighted averages.  
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Cluster Correlated Errors 
The model is also examined for cluster correlated errors. Clustering can occur 
when residuals of hospitals within the same state correlate with each other. This 
intragroup correlation of the errors may create a clustering effect that could produce 
inconsistent estimates of the covariance matrix.  One assumption for the Hausman-Taylor 
model to produce consistent and efficient parameter estimates is that the idiosyncratic 
errors are homoskedastic, with zero mean and constant variance across time and 
individuals (i.e., itη ~ iid (0, 2ησ )). In the presence of clustered errors, the off-diagonal 
elements of the covariance matrix might not be zero due to potential correlations of the 
errors among hospitals within the same state. In addition, the diagonal elements might not 
be identical since the clustering of hospitals by states might lead to different variances 
along the diagonals of the covariance matrix.  As a result, the parameter estimates will be 
inefficient although they are still consistent.  
The Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) and Cook-Weisberg tests 
are performed on the pooled cross-sectional final sample to test for state effects in the 
form of cluster correlated errors. Under the null hypothesis, both tests follow a Chi-
square distribution. We should note that the LM test is not designed specifically to test 
for cluster-correlated errors. It captures other types of heteroskedasticity as well. Table 14 
presents the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test statistics. The critical value for the Chi-
squared distribution with 30 degrees of freedom is 43.77. The table therefore shows that 
with a test statistics of 3674.05, there is almost no probability that the distribution is Chi-
squared. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected, meaning there is some 
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evidence that the errors are correlated or heteroskedastic.  A robust cluster estimator of 
the variance covariance matrix should be used to correct for the estimated residuals.  
Table 14: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 
 Uncompensated Care 
Final Sample chi2(30)     =  3674.05,   Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
However, the literature reveals no commonly adopted corrections to obtain robust 
cluster estimators for the Hausman-Taylor procedure.  Thus, the HTIV estimator does not 
correct for cluster correlated errors. Because such a robust estimator exists in the pooled 
OLS and the random effects GLS model, we report robust variance matrix estimator for 
these estimation procedures.  
A Test for Endogeneity 
The Hausman test is devised for a number of model specifications in 
econometrics including endogeneity as a result of unobserved individual factors 
(Hausman 1978). To the extent that unobserved hospital heterogeneity remains an 
omitted influence on our right hand side variables, we conduct the Hausman test using 
the property of fixed effects (FE) estimation*****. FE will produce consistent parameter 
estimates in the presence of endogeneity as a result of unobserved hospital effects. 
However, in the absence of such an endogeneity and/or the presence of cluster correlated 
                                                 
 
 
***** FE will only be used for the purpose of the specification test and not as part of the estimation 
procedure because FE does not allow us to estimate the coefficients on the regulatory variables.  
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errors, such estimates will be asymptotically inefficient. Similar to FE, an HTIV 
estimator is consistent under both the null and alternative hypothesis.  On the other hand, 
under the hypothesis of no misspecification (i.e., no latent hospital effects), random effect 
GLS models will yield consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators, where 
efficiency is defined as attaining the asymptotic Cramer-Rao upper/lower bound.  We 
therefore utilize the properties of these three estimators (FE, HTIV and GLS) to construct 
several tests of misspecification.   
Results 
The Hausman test based on the difference between FE and GLS estimates yields 
χ2 =45.02 with 12 degrees of freedom which is significant (p=0) for the nonprofit 
hospitals sample (Table 15.1). This rejects the null that there is no correlation between 
the individual hospital effects and explanatory variables. In other words, there is evidence 
that latent individual effects exist and GLS will yield inconsistent parameter estimates. 
The Hausman test based on the difference between FE and HTIV estimator yields χ2 =1.5 
with one degree of freedom which is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.22) (Table 15.2). 
The same tests yield similar results for the for-profit hospital sample. The Hausman test 
based on the difference between FE and GLS estimates yields χ2 =35.9 with 11 degrees of 
freedom which is significant (Table 15.3) and χ2 =4.26 with two degrees of freedom 
which is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.12) when testing for the difference between 
FE and HTIV estimators (Table 15.4)  Results from the Hausman tests justify the use of 
the HTIV method. 
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Table 15.1: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS 
Number of Admissions (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 a b Difference S.E. 
Technology Intensity -6.25 18.48 -24.72 13.07 
ER 26.53 47.49 -20.95 28.39 
Teaching hospital status -64.72 37.62 -102.34 57.10 
Proportion with public owner -22.53 -38.76 16.23 10.76 
Hospital size 0.71 1.68 -0.96 0.25 
Proportion network/system member -1.33 -1.56 0.22 1.23 
HHI 191.62 -148.73 340.35 318.43 
HMO penetration -27.63 -3.23 -24.40 43.40 
Percentage of population 65+ -0.31 -1.04 0.73 165.34 
Per capita income 56.46 -0.63 57.09 12.90 
Percent uninsured -283.09 10.37 -293.46 318.98 
Rural 62.61 -21.79 84.41 108.46 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
    
chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
               =       45.02     
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  
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Table 15.2: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV 
Number of Admissions (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 a b Difference S.E. 
Technology Intensity -6.25 -2.50 -3.75 4.80 
ER 26.53 26.06 0.47 13.92 
Teaching hospital status -64.72 -56.88 -7.84 14.65 
Proportion with public owner -22.53 -19.33 -3.19 3.73 
Hospital size 0.71 0.72 -0.01 0.05 
Proportion network/system member -1.33 -1.57 0.23 0.41 
HHI 191.62 172.02 19.60 64.69 
HMO penetration -27.63 -18.65 -8.99 31.93 
Percentage of population 65+ -0.31 -108.47 108.15 93.76 
Per capita income 56.46 54.48 1.98 2.96 
Percent uninsured -283.09 31.11 -314.20 289.77 
Rural 62.61 16.60 46.01 48.55 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xthtaylor 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
             =        1.50 
Prob>chi2 =      0.2201 
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Table 15.3: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS 
Number of Admissions (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 a b Difference S.E. 
Technology Intensity -42.28 22.03 -64.31 16.72 
ER -9.16 87.95 -97.11 43.03 
Teaching hospital status -59.30 -64.21 4.91 99.11 
Proportion with public owner -41.11 -14.24 -26.87 38.20 
Hospital size 0.04 1.14 -1.10 0.27 
Proportion network/system member -3.09 -1.59 -1.50 5.97 
HHI -131.55 -59.99 -71.56 763.52 
HMO penetration 230.54 -0.78 231.32 122.36 
Percentage of population 65+ 390.48 -1.51 391.99 476.92 
Per capita income 25.91 9.88 16.03 22.69 
Percent uninsured 91.35 34.12 57.23 416.74 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic  
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
               =       35.90    
Prob>chi2 =      0.0002    
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Table 15.4: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV 
Number of Admissions (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 a b Difference S.E. 
Technology Intensity -42.28 -40.34 -1.94 15.58 
ER -9.16 -10.85 1.69 54.64 
Teaching hospital status -59.30 -53.72 -5.57 74.55 
Proportion with public owner -41.11 -40.04 -1.07 26.43 
Hospital size 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.21 
Proportion network/system member -3.09 -5.17 2.08 4.36 
HHI -131.55 -58.81 -72.74 498.27 
HMO penetration 230.54 14.96 215.59 119.85 
Percentage of population 65+ 390.48 45.95 344.53 471.01 
Per capita income 25.91 25.97 -0.06 14.88 
Percent uninsured 91.35 98.22 -6.87 393.55 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xthtaylor 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic  
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
            =        4.26    
Prob>chi2 =      0.1188    
 
However, some important caveats should be noted. First, HTIV estimation has 
weak identification due to data limitations. Some time-varying exogenous variables 
which the HTIV procedure uses to construct internal instruments have low variation. In 
addition, variables such as uninsurance rate, percent of population over 65 and HMO 
penetration are adjusted by population growth due to lack of data for some study years. 
Specifically, we computed values for 2003 and 2004 market level variables using the 
2002 county level data. As a result, the internal instruments constructed based on these 
population adjusted variables not reflect the true underlying changes in the HMO 
penetration, percent over 65, and uninsurance rate. However, these internal instruments 
are not completely invalid because even real changes in these variables reflect population 
changes over time to some extent because changes in population could change the 
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percentage of HMO penetration, population that are over 65 or uninsurance rate.  
However, this manipulation of multiplying all three variables by the same growth trend 
likely introduces a new measurement bias to the parameter estimates.  Second, there may 
be potential misclassification of endogenous/exogenous variables. Third, comparing FE 
and HTIV estimators, a few coefficient estimates such as the uninsurance rate in the 
nonprofit model and the percent of population over 65 in the for-profit model exhibit 
large differences. However, most of the estimates are similar in both magnitude and sign.  
 Table 16 and Table 17 present results from the GLS and HTIV estimation 
respectively. Pooled OLS results are reported in Appendix G. Even though the Hausman 
specification tests show evidence of inconsistency, the GLS procedure yields meaningful 
estimates. First, all the significant regulatory variables in the GLS model are of similar 
signs to those in the HTIV model, which, despite its problems discussed previously, are 
not significantly different from the consistent but less efficient FE model as shown by the 
Hausman test. Second, comparing with the HTIV results, endogeneity due to omitted 
variables or unobserved heterogeneity seems to bias our GLS estimates for the regulatory 
variables downward for the nonprofit hospital sample. This may suggest that the 
magnitude of the true regulatory effects might be even larger than what we have 
estimated using the GLS procedure. Significant variables therefore in our GLS model 
could be even more significant if the magnitude of the true effects are greater.   For the 
for-profit hospital sample, the comparison of GLS vs. HTIV again shows that GLS tends 
to underestimate the magnitude of the true regulatory effects but the HTIV estimates are 
extremely large. It is not clear to us whether the large HTIV estimates for the regulatory 
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variables in the for-profit model result from the problem discussed previously or the 
limited sample size (N=295).  
 Given the caveats of each model, findings are reported based on the GLS 
estimation and validated by the HTIV estimates. Even though both the GLS and HTIV 
methods have their limitations, our cross-validation provides a way to overcome some of 
the drawbacks. A comparison of the fixed effects estimation with the HTIV using the 
Hausman test shows that most of the HTIV estimates are consistent despite the problems 
with identification and measurement. A comparison of the GLS and HTIV estimates 
gives us some information on the direction of the bias for the GLS model. Results from 
these analyses should however be interpreted with caution.  
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Table 16: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON 10.73** 0.07** 3.95 0.25*** 
REQUIREMENT 9.71 -0.63*** -42.34*** 0.69*** 
POOL 51.55* 0.51* -131.97*** 1.14* 
CON*REQUIREMENT -1.91 0.02 - - 
CON*POOL 26.82*** 0.14*** 18.67*** 0.004 
POOL*REQUIREMENT 46.33 0.35 231.69*** -0.12 
CON*REQUIREMENT*PO
OL 
-20.49*** -0.11 -19.57*** 0.03 
     
Technology Intensity 35.57 -0.26** 39.37 -0.36** 
ER 19.61 0.28 51.08 0.19 
Teaching hospital status 56.27 0.22 -28.81 -0.18 
Proportion with public 
owner 
-2383.43*** -7.35 -872.67 -1.66 
Hospital size 1.60*** -0.001 0.97*** -0.004*** 
Proportion network/system 
member 
-191.01 -2.79* -254.34 -6.12 
     
HHI -62.6 -0.21 -148.07** 0.31 
HMO penetration -214.63*** -1.68 -123.36 2.87 
Percentage of population 
65+ 
-11.23*** -0.06 0.25 -0.08 
Per capita income -2.27 -0.004 8.03** 0.06 
Percent uninsured 3.42 0.17 36.24*** 0.06 
Rural -0.56 0.02 -19.28 0.67 
2003 37.17** 0.07 34.40** 0.34 
2004 81.56*** 0.18 108.85*** 1.07 
Constant 123.27 3.78*** -578.55*** -2.48 
N 2235 295 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01 
 93
Table 17: HTIV Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON 38.87 0.07 738.43 6.90 
REQUIREMENT -77.61 -3.36 3342.12 30.07 
POOL 382.01 1.42 5030.90 65.76 
CON*REQUIREMENT 15.71 0.17 - - 
CON*POOL 66.32 0.25 -484.41 -5.61 
POOL*REQUIREMENT 385.07 3.68 -3231.54 -45.64 
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL -49.15 -0.21 148.01 1.68 
     
Technology Intensity -2.50 -0.19 -40.34 -0.45 
ER 26.06 0.22 -10.85 -0.19 
Teaching hospital status -56.88 -0.58 -53.72 0.92 
Proportion with public owner -19.33 -0.22 -40.04 -0.40 
Hospital size 0.72*** 0.85 0.07 0.0016 
Proportion network/system 
member 
-1.57** -0.03 -5.17 -0.06 
     
HHI 172.02 -2.04 -58.81 -2.42 
HMO penetration -18.65 -0.03 14.96 0.76 
Percentage of population 65+ -108.47 -0.15 45.95 -0.06 
Per capita income 54.48 -0.04 25.97 -0.70* 
Percent uninsured 31.11 0.24 98.22 5.33 
Rural 16.60 0.0022 359.39 4.34 
2003 27.78*** -0.19 66.16*** -1.41*** 
2004 69.26*** -0.11 138.09*** -0.71*** 
Constant -264.45 7.58 -9083.74 -30.29 
N 2235 295 
               *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01 
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Regulatory Variables 
Results obtained from the GLS procedure show that controlling for other 
covariates, CON laws, acting individually, have increased both the number and percent of 
nonprofit hospital admissions for the uninsured. Results obtained from the HTIV 
procedure yield larger estimates for the CON variable in the number of admissions model 
and the same estimates in the percent of admissions model, but neither of them is 
statistically significant at the conventional levels. Although there are limitations with 
both the GLS and HTIV procedure, the cross validation suggests that the true effects of 
CON on nonprofit hospital admissions for the uninsured is positive and may be larger 
than what the GLS model predicts, indicating that nonprofit hospitals are more capable of 
providing such care in states with CON laws. This finding is consistent with what the 
model predicts.  
Compared to nonprofit hospitals, GLS results did not show that CON laws alone 
have any effect on for-profit hospital’s number of uncompensated care admissions. 
However, CON laws are significantly positively related to the percent of admissions for 
the uninsured by for-profit hospitals. The HTIV model yields much larger estimates for 
the regulatory effects and the signs are consistent with the GLS estimates. The cross-
validation shows that CON may have a positive impact on for-profit hospital’s percent of 
uninsured admissions, suggesting that for-profit hospitals in CON states tend to devote a 
larger share of their resources to provide services to the uninsured. Since for-profit 
hospitals perceive the failure to obtain CON as a profit loss, they might increase their 
uncompensated care provision in states with such a regulation. However, given the 
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limited for-profit sample and potential problem of weak identification with the HTIV 
model, this result deserves further investigation.   
Both the GLS and the HTIV estimation report a positive effect of the pool on 
nonprofit hospitals for the number and percent of admissions for the uninsured, though 
the HTIV model shows a much greater magnitude. This is consistent with our prediction 
that uncompensated care pools, acting alone, lead to more nonprofit hospital admissions 
for the uninsured. It suggests that nonprofit hospitals respond to price subsidies by 
increasing their uncompensated care provision. For for-profit hospitals, uncompensated 
care pools are found to be negatively associated with the number of admissions for the 
uninsured but positively related to the percent of admissions in the GLS model. The 
HTIV model did not yield consistent results with the GLS estimates. This finding is 
confounding and needs further investigation given our small for-profit sample size 
(N=295) and limited number of years (N=3) in the sample.  
Community benefit requirement laws are found to have a positive but 
insignificant impact on the number of uninsured admissions and a significant negative 
effect on the percent of self-pay/charity admissions for nonprofit hospitals. The HTIV 
estimation yields a negative yet insignificant impact on both the number and percent of 
admissions for nonprofit hospitals. The cross-validation suggests that community benefit 
requirement laws tend to decrease nonprofit hospital’s percent of uninsured admissions. 
There are two possible explanations. First, nonprofit hospitals may decrease their 
uncompensated care provision as a result of adjusting to the amount required by 
community benefit requirement laws.  If nonprofit hospitals are already providing a 
higher level of uncompensated care than required by the regulation, community benefit 
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requirement laws may become a non-binding constraint. Since these laws explicitly 
communicate the amount of uncompensated care nonprofit hospitals should provide, they 
might send a signal to those hospitals that are already providing a higher level than 
expected by the community. Consequently, these hospitals decrease their uncompensated 
care provision because they realize that they are unnecessarily over-producing such care. 
Second, these laws may have improved preventive/primary care for the uninsured which 
led to a decrease in the demand for inpatient care. Since community benefit requirement 
laws typically require that nonprofit hospitals provide health promotion services, research 
and education, open access to services, and community orientation in addition to 
uncompensated care (Ginn & Moseley, 2006), it is possible that community benefit 
requirement laws have enhanced access to preventive/primary care for the community. 
As a result, there is a decrease in the overall demand for inpatient care, which might lead 
to a decrease in admissions for the uninsured. Since we only have inpatient care data, we 
are limited in establishing a causal link between community benefit requirement laws and 
the decrease in self-pay/charity admissions. However, this remains a possibility. 
These laws have led to a different result for for-profit hospitals. The GLS finding 
shows that community benefit requirement laws are negatively related to the uninsured 
admissions and positively associated with the percent of admissions for the uninsured 
among for-profit hospitals, suggesting that the laws may decrease the total number of the 
admissions but decrease the uninsured admissions less. The HTIV model shows a larger 
positive effect on the percent of uninsured admissions by for-profit hospitals. The overall 
evidence indicates that for-profit hospitals devote a larger share of their resources to 
uncompensated care. It could be that both the overall admissions and the number of self-
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pay/charity admissions decreased as suggested by reasons such as improved overall 
preventive/primary care, but for-profit hospitals devote a larger share of their resources to 
uncompensated care in response to community benefit requirement laws despite such a 
decrease in demand among the general population. Or as the HTIV results suggest, for-
profit increase their uncompensated care provision in response to such laws. This can be 
explained by reasons suggested by previous literature that for-profit hospitals treat failure 
to meet community expectations as a cost. Since community benefit requirement laws 
explicitly express community expectations, it is not surprising that for-profit respond to 
community expectations by increasing their uncompensated care provision, even though 
these laws are not intended for them. It is a profit maximizing strategy for for-profit 
hospitals to increase their uncompensated care provision in the presence of community 
benefit requirement laws. Again we need to be cautious about these findings given the 
limitations of both the GLS and HTIV models.  
Results from the estimations also show evidence of significant policy interaction 
effects. The GLS model shows that CON laws and uncompensated care pools have 
jointly increased nonprofit hospital’s uncompensated care provision, indicating that CON 
laws and uncompensated care pools may have reinforced each other’s effectiveness for 
the nonprofit hospitals. Results from the HTIV estimation provide support for this 
observation. One possible explanation for this result for nonprofit hospitals is that with 
CON laws creating a marketplace of less competition, price subsidies may be more 
effective in encouraging hospitals to increase their provision of services to the uninsured. 
We also calculated the total effect of the regulations on uninsured admissions 
based on the GLS estimates. Tables 18.1-2 present results from this calculation. The 
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green columns provide the parameter estimates for the total effects of the regulations on 
the number/percent of admissions and the yellow columns present regulatory intensities 
as discussed previously in the sample construction. For example, in Table 18.1, the first 
green column represents estimated total effects for CON when states have either both 
CON and pool or all three regulations and the second column reports estimated total 
effects of uncompensated care pools when states have either both CON and pool or all 
three regulations. The different values of CON correspond to the total effects of pool or 
CON as the intensity of CON increases. Specifically, it shows that as the intensity of 
CON laws increases on the intensity scale from 8.1 to 15, to 18.4, the total effects of 
CON on nonprofit hospital uncompensated care provision increase from 521, to 966, to 
1184 admissions for states that have both CON laws and mandatory uncompensated care 
pools (POOL is evaluated at 2 on the intensity scale). For for-profit hospitals, although 
the GLS estimates yields a positive association between CON laws interacted with 
uncompensated care pools and number of uninsured admissions, the HTIV estimates give 
the opposite results. It is possible that this discrepancy is a result of the small for-profit 
sample since the HTIV procedure is sensitive to sample sizes. The consistent estimates 
between the GLS and HTIV estimations for the larger nonprofit sample support this 
possibility. Nevertheless, due to such limitations with our sample and methodology, we 
do not have sufficient evidence to show that CON laws acting jointly with 
uncompensated care pools might have a substitution effect on public subsidies.  
Results from the GLS suggest that community benefit requirement laws, acting 
jointly with the uncompensated care pools, have slightly increased the for-profit number 
of admissions for the uninsured. However, again the HTIV estimates are inconsistent 
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with the GLS results. Although it is likely that the true effects could be larger than what 
the GLS model predicts, given the tendency of the GLS model to underestimate the 
regulatory effect, we do not have enough evidence to substantiate this claim. Further 
investigation is needed to confirm if for-profit hospitals in states with both a mandatory 
pool and a moderate community benefit requirement regulation tend to have more self-
pay/charity care admissions than those in states with only CON regulations.   
All three policies working together were found to decrease the number of 
admissions for the uninsured among nonprofit hospitals, which are supported by both the 
GLS and HTIV estimates although the latter are not statistically significant. While CON 
laws and uncompensated care pools have jointly increased the number of admissions for 
the uninsured, adopting all three policies tends to reduce that number. As a result, the 
total effect of implementing CON or uncompensated care pool results is a reduction in 
uncompensated care provided by nonprofit hospitals if states adopt all three policies 
(Table 18.1). One possible explanation might be that community benefit requirement 
laws have reduced inpatient admissions and thus reducing nonprofit hospitals’ reliance on 
public subsidies and cross-subsidization of uncompensated care.  Another potential 
explanation would be that if the community benefit requirement is set below the level at 
which hospitals actually provide uncompensated care, it could provide a signal to reduce 
their provision of care by suggesting that their prior levels of such care are above the 
levels expected by the community. We, however, are not able to distinguish the impact of 
the joint effects on the number or percent of admissions for the uninsured among for-
profit hospitals. In our for-profit hospital sample, the interactions of three policies 
working together happen to be perfectly collinear with the joint variations of CON laws 
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and requirement regulations.  The binary interaction was dropped out of the model and 
consequently we are not able to conclude whether the parameter estimate on the three-
way interactions is due to the impact of all three policies working jointly.    
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Table 18.1: Total effects of Regulations on Nonprofit Hospital Provision of 
Uncompensated Care (GLS) 
Number of Admissions Percent of Admissions 
Estimated 
Total 
Effects of 
CON 
 Estimated 
Total 
Effects of 
Pool 
 Estimated 
Total 
Effects of 
CON 
 
 when POOL=2 and  when POOL=2 and  when POOL=2 and 
521.397 CON=8.1 528.836 CON=8.1 0.891 CON=8.1 
965.55 CON=15 891.5 CON=15 1.65 CON=15 
1184.408 CON=18.4 1070.204 CON=18.4 2.024 CON=18.4 
      
 when POOL=2;  
REQUIREMENT=3 
and 
 when POOL=2;  
REQUIREMENT=3 
and 
  
-173.421 CON=8.1 -135.04 when CON=8.1   
-321.15 CON=15 -337.9 when CON=15   
-393.944 CON=18.4 -437.86 when CON=18.4   
 
 
 
Table 18.2: Total effects of Regulations on For-profit Hospital Provision of 
Uncompensated Care (GLS) 
Number of Admissions 
Estimated 
Total 
Effects of 
Community 
Benefit 
Requirement 
 Estimated 
Total 
Effects of 
Pool 
 
   when POOL=2 and 
1263.12 when POOL=2 and  
REQUIREMENT=3  
-28.698 CON=6.3 
  508.998  CON=20.7 
    
  1126.2 when POOL=2 and  
REQUIREMENT=3 
 
To compare our results with previous studies that do not typically control for 
policy interactions, we also test how our estimation results differ from prior findings. 
Using the same GLS estimation, Tables 19.1-19.2 show that when CON laws alone are 
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included in the model, there is a positive but insignificant impact on uncompensated care 
provision by nonprofit hospitals, and a negative but insignificant effect on number of 
uninsured admissions by for-profit hospitals. Both signs are in the expected direction.  In 
addition, we find a significant positive, yet marginal, effect on the percent of admissions 
by for-profit hospitals. A one unit increase on the intensity scale is associated with a .19 
percent increase in the for-profit hospital admissions for the uninsured. Uncompensated 
care pools are found to significantly increase both the number and percent of 
uncompensated care admissions by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. This finding is 
consistent with the existing evidence. For community benefit requirement laws, the 
coefficient on the number of uncompensated care variable for nonprofit hospitals is 
positive and  insignificant and that for for-profit hospital is negative and significant, 
which is the same with what we find when other policies and their interactions are 
included.  The findings are identical for the percent of uncompensated care admissions 
variable with or without other policies and their interactions. These results indicate that 
community benefit requirement laws tend not to be significantly influenced by CON laws 
or uncompensated care pools regulations. This is reasonable given that hospitals are 
expected to abide by community benefit requirement laws if they are considered as 
binding requirements.  
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Table 19.1: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or 
Interactions (Nonprofit) 
 W/O Other Policies or 
Interactions 
W/ Other Policies or 
Interactions 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON 3.26 -0.02 10.73** 0.07** 
REQUIREMENT 9.71 -0.63*** 9.71 -0.63*** 
POOL 154.27*** 0.88*** 51.55* 0.51* 
CON*REQUIREMENT - - -1.91 0.02 
CON*POOL - - 26.82*** 0.14*** 
POOL*REQUIREMENT - - 46.33 0.35 
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL - - -20.49*** -0.11 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01 
 
 
Table 19.2: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or 
Interactions (For-profit) 
 W/O Other Policies or 
Interactions 
W/ Other Policies or Interactions 
Variables Number of 
Admission
s 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON -2.26 0.19* 3.95 0.25*** 
REQUIREMENT -42.34*** 0.67*** -42.34*** 0.69*** 
POOL 117.82*** 2.15** -131.97*** 1.14* 
CON*REQUIREMENT - - - - 
CON*POOL - - 18.67*** 0.004 
POOL*REQUIREMENT - - 231.69*** -0.12 
CON*REQUIREMENT*PO
OL 
- - -19.57*** 0.03 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01 
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Market Characteristics 
Our GLS results for the market level characteristics are largely consistent with the 
previous literature. HMO penetration is found to have a significant negative impact on 
the number of nonprofit hospital admissions for uninsured patients and a non-significant 
negative impact on the percent of admissions for uninsured patients. The HTIV results 
validate this association but the coefficients are statistically insignificant. One reason to 
explain this negative relationship is that high levels of HMO penetration tend to reduce 
the price for paying patients, and as a result, nonprofit hospitals have less revenue to 
cross-subsidize services to the uninsured. At the same time, market penetration by HMOs 
might also reduce the admissions for the insured patients, which makes the proportion of 
admissions for the uninsured largely unchanged.  Given our relatively small sample size 
(N=295), we fail to find a significant impact of HMO penetration on the number or 
percent of admissions for the uninsured among for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation. 
The HTIV procedure yields a positive effect of HMO penetration on for-profit hospitals. 
Although the sign is of the expected direction, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  
The GLS results show a negative association between HHI and the for-profit 
hospital’s uncompensated care provision, which is consistent with the HTIV estimate. In 
other words, in markets with higher HHI, which implies higher industry concentration, 
for-profit hospitals have fewer uncompensated care admissions. This finding based on the 
cross-validation of both models is consistent with our prediction that for-profit hospitals 
respond to higher competition by increasing their uncompensated care provision and 
react to lower competition by decreasing it. A plausible explanation is higher industry 
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concentration might have made paid care more expensive and hence the cost of 
uncompensated care is higher. Although we fail to find a significant association between 
market concentration and nonprofit hospital uncompensated care provision, this is 
consistent with findings from previous studies that examine the impact of various other 
regulations on hospital provision of uncompensated care (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2006).  
A higher percentage of uninsured was found to be significantly associated with 
more admissions for the uninsured for for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation and 
insignificant in the HTIV estimation. The percent of population over 65 was negatively 
related to uncompensated care provision for nonprofit hospitals in both estimation 
procedures. These results could suggest that in places where health insurance coverage 
for the non-elderly is low, hospitals face greater demand for uncompensated care. Per 
capita income is found to be positively related to the number of admissions for the 
uninsured for for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation. This finding is contradictory to 
our prediction and merits further attention. Even though we did not find a significant 
impact of the percent of uninsured on nonprofit hospital provision of uncompensated care, 
this finding is consistent with results from prior studies (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2006). 
Hospital Characteristics 
Some hospital characteristics have also significantly influenced a hospital’s 
ability to provide uncompensated care.  For both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, 
technological intensity is found to be negatively related to their percent of 
uncompensated care admissions in both the GLS and HTIV estimations although the 
HTIV estimates are insignificant. This cross-validation could mean that hospitals that are 
more technologically sophisticated have higher number of admissions for paying patients. 
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One explanation for this result might be that such hospitals may provide better quality of 
care than hospitals with lower technology intensity and hence attracting more paying 
patients.   
Not surprisingly, for both types of hospitals increasing bed size is associated with 
an increasing number of admissions that are self-pay or charity.  However, among for-
profit hospitals, size is negatively related to the percent of admissions for the uninsured in 
the GLS estimation, while we are unable to detect any effect of bed size on the share of 
uncompensated admissions among non-profit hospitals.  This finding was not validated 
by the HTIV model and requires further investigation.   
The percent of public hospitals in the market is significantly negatively related to 
the number of admissions for the uninsured among nonprofit hospitals in both GLS and 
HTIV estimations. This means that public hospitals may have crowded out nonprofit 
hospitals in terms of their uncompensated care provision. Similarly, we find that the 
higher the percent of hospitals that belong to a network/system, the lower the percent of 
uncompensated care admissions by nonprofit hospitals as validated by both the GLS and 
HTIV procedures. Since research indicates that hospitals within a network/system 
provide more uncompensated care than those that are not in a network/system (Bazzoli, 
Lindrooth et al. 2006), it is not surprising that their presence will lead to a crowd-out 
effect on nonprofit hospital provision of such services. We did not, however, find any 
significant impact of public hospitals or network/systems hospitals on for-profit hospitals 
although both GLS and HTIV estimation yield a negative but insignificant association. 
We might not have enough data to identify the effect given our sample size. 
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Wrapping up, our findings from the cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV are 
summarized in Table 20. The strength of the evidence was indicated by three stars 
(meaning the GLS and HTIV procedures yield consistent results) or no star (meaning the 
GLS and HTIV model produces inconsistent results). The table also shows whether our 
results conformed to the hypotheses. Even though both the GLS and HTIV methods have 
their limitations, our cross-validation provides a way to overcome some of the drawbacks. 
As can be seen from the table, most of our GLS and HTIV findings are consistent and 
conform to our predictions. Some of our results however need further investigation 
because we do not have strong evidence to reach a conclusion.   
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Table 20: Summary of Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision 
 Uncompensated Care 
Variables Nonprofit For-profit 
 Predicted Found Predicted  Found 
  Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
 Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Regulatory Measures       
CON + +*** +*** +/-  +*** 
POOL + +*** +*** + - +*** 
REQUIREMENT +  -*** +/- - +*** 
CON*POOL + +*** +*** +/- +  
CON* REQUIREMENT +/-   +/-   
POOL*REQUIREMENT +/-   +/- +  
CON*POOL* REQUIREMENT +/- - ***  +/- -  
       
Hospital Characteristics       
Teaching hospital status +   +   
Percent of public hospital  - -***  +   
Technology intensity +  -*** +   
Hospital size + +***  + +*** - 
ER +   +   
Percent of network/system member -  -*** +   
       
Market Characteristics       
HHI +   - -***  
HMO penetration - -***  +   
Percentage of population aged 65 
or above 
- -***  -   
Per capita income -   - +***  
Percentage of population that are 
uninsured 
+   + +***  
Rural -   -   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the dissertation research. The first section 
summarizes the results while the second section discusses policy implications. Study 
limitations and extensions for future research are provided in the last section.  
Summary  
This dissertation examines the effects of various state regulations on hospital 
provision of uncompensated care and analyzes both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals’ 
responsiveness to the regulatory environment.  
Despite the limitations with our data and methodology, our findings from the 
cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV models suggest that nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals respond to some policy instruments similarly and others differently. For 
example, our evidence suggests that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to 
CON laws by increasing their uncompensated care provision.  This may be partially 
attributed to the fact that nonprofit hospitals behave differently in markets with different 
levels of industry concentration. As suggested by the literature, nonprofit hospitals 
increase their uncompensated care provision when industry concentration grows. For-
profit hospitals, although responding to CON regulations in similar ways, may view 
failure to obtain CON regulations as a cost. Their increase in uncompensated care 
provision is a strategy to maximize profits.  Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals also 
respond to policy incentives such as community benefit requirement laws differently. 
These laws were found to decrease the uncompensated care provision by nonprofit 
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hospitals, while increasing the provision of such care by for-profit hospitals. This is an 
interesting finding suggesting that community benefit requirement laws may have sent a 
signal of overproducing uncompensated care to the nonprofit hospitals that are already 
providing a higher level of uncompensated care than mandated. They may have also 
improved preventive/primary care for the uninsured which consequently led to a decrease 
in demand for inpatient care. However, we lack primary/preventive care data to validate 
such a connection. The findings also suggest that again for-profit hospitals might 
consider providing uncompensated care as a profit maximizing strategy and hence 
respond to community benefit requirement laws by increasing their supply of 
uncompensated care. It is also plausible that in markets where nonprofit hospitals reduce 
their uncompensated care provision, for-profit hospitals increase their provision of such 
care. This is because a decrease in uncompensated care provision increases unmet 
demand for such care, which in turn increases community expectations regard hospital 
provision of uncompensated care. Since for-profit hospitals respond to an increase in 
community expectations by increasing their uncompensated care provision, they might 
increase such provision when nonprofit hospitals decrease it. However, it is not clear to 
us if the total market level of uncompensated care has changed as a result of such a shift.  
In addition to the above differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, 
regulations working together can in some cases enhance the effectiveness of one another. 
For example, uncompensated care pools, when interacted with CON laws, have greatly 
increased uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals. When the three policies 
are implemented together, community benefit requirement laws seem to have limited the 
need for nonprofit hospitals to seek support from the uncompensated care pools or cross-
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subsidization of services. Specifically, these laws might have improved 
preventive/primary care for the uninsured so that the demand for the more costly 
inpatient care is reduced. As a result, nonprofit hospitals could reduce their reliance on 
uncompensated care pools to reimburse for their free care.  Another potential explanation 
is these laws might have send a signal to nonprofit hospitals already providing a higher 
level of uncompensated care than required by such a regulation to reduce their care.  
Some hospital characteristics also influence uncompensated care provision by 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Larger hospitals tend to provide more uncompensated 
care than smaller hospitals, both nonprofit and for-profit. Nonprofit hospitals that are 
more technologically sophisticated tend to have a lower percentage of uncompensated 
care. The presence of public hospitals and hospitals that belong to a network/system in a 
local market lead to lower uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals in that 
same market.  
Both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to the market environment by 
adjusting their uncompensated care provision. For-profit hospitals decrease their 
uncompensated care provision when market concentration is high and increase such 
provisions when uninsured populations increase. Nonprofit hospitals decrease their 
uncompensated care provision when HMO penetration increases market competition.   
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Policy Implications 
The study results have significant implications for state health policies that aim at 
improving access to care for the underinsured and uninsured. Reductions in the provision 
of uncompensated care by hospitals have limited access to care for those who need it 
most. Further the disproportionate distribution of the uncompensated care burden has 
started to jeopardize the financial stability of some hospitals, particularly those that are 
considered as safety-net hospitals for the economically disadvantaged. Understanding the 
influence of the regulatory environment, especially policy interactions will help 
policymakers design more complex strategies to address these important issues.   
Our study has significant implications for states that do not have CON laws or are 
reexamining the impact of their existing CON laws on uncompensated care provision. 
Our findings indicate that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to CON laws by 
increasing their uncompensated care provision. As suggested by previous literature, with 
CON laws creating a marketplace of less competition, nonprofit hospitals have more 
resources to cross subsidize uncompensated care. For-profit hospitals might perceive the 
failure to obtain CON as a profit loss and increase their uncompensated care provision in 
states with such a CON regulation. Therefore, implementing such a policy in either a 
mixed ownership market or in markets dominated by nonprofit hospitals may be able to 
increase access to care for the uninsured.   
State policies aimed at assisting safety-net hospitals may consider providing 
public subsidies in combination with regulations that explicitly communicate community 
expectations. Our evidence suggests that explicit expression of community expectations 
reduces the provision of uncompensated care by non-profit hospitals and results in greater 
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provision of such care by for-profit hospitals. This result indicates that the new IRS 
rulings on nonprofit hospital reporting of community benefits may have unintended 
indirect effects on for-profit hospitals because in mixed ownership markets where 
community benefit requirement laws are implemented, for-profit hospitals may provide 
more uncompensated care. In markets dominated by nonprofit hospitals, implementing 
community benefit requirement regulations may not increase uncompensated care 
provision by nonprofit hospitals. Such regulations may send a signal to those hospitals 
that are already providing a higher level of uncompensated care than expected by the 
community. Consequently, these nonprofit hospitals decrease their uncompensated care 
provision because they realize that they are unnecessarily over-producing such care. We 
do not have enough evidence to show, however, if the total market level of 
uncompensated care has changed as a result of such a shift of uncompensated care 
provision from nonprofit to for-profit hospitals. The net changes in the amount of 
uncompensated care at the market level will depend on the magnitude of the decrease by 
nonprofit hospitals and increase by for-profit hospitals. 
Implementing policies that suppress competition (e.g., CON laws) and public 
subsidies (e.g., uncompensated care pools) together may increase the effectiveness of 
both types of regulations for nonprofit hospitals. Because nonprofit hospitals largely rely 
on cross-subsidization of services to provide uncompensated care, a less competitive 
market will enhance their financial ability to do so. Further incentives from public 
subsidies will increase their willingness to provide uncompensated care.  
Other findings of the study indicate that there is a significant crowd-out effect by 
public hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals are particularly sensitive to the amount of 
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uncompensated care provided by public hospitals in the same market. They reduce their 
uncompensated care when there is a large presence of public hospitals in the market. 
Although public hospitals are not the focus of this study, they play a central role in 
promoting health in the community. Policy makers need to understand the extent and 
magnitude of the crowd-out effect in order to write appropriate policy prescriptions to 
support safety-net hospitals.  
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Study Limitations and Future Research 
The current study benefited from our ability to examine various regulations using 
comprehensive information on admissions for the uninsured, an improved alternative 
measure of uncompensated care. However, important limitations must be noted.  
First, despite being a powerful technique to correct endogeneity as a result of 
latent individual effects, the HTIV procedure suffers from weak identification due to our 
data limitations. Although we cross-validate results using a random effects GLS, future 
studies will benefit from obtaining data that have more variations for some time-varying 
variables so as to improve the HTIV estimation.    
Second, our measures of the regulatory variables do not capture all the variations 
of the policies under investigation, so we are unable to completely eliminate the potential 
confounding factor ---- state effects. In other words, the lack of such a precise measure 
limits our ability to completely separate the effects of being in a particular state and the 
effects of the regulations.  Future efforts should focus on conducting surveys with the 
states to collect data on all dimensions of each regulation (e.g., scope, length, 
restrictiveness and uncertainty).  Methods to operationalize these dimensions also deserve 
further attention.  
Another limitation of the study is the lack of hospital discharge data on other non-
study states. Although our study represents a comprehensive analysis of these regulations 
using uncompensated care admission as a measure, we only have data on 17 states. 
Selection bias remains a potential problem even though we have good reasons to believe 
that HCUP participating and non-participating states are not systematically different in 
terms of their uncompensated care provision. In addition, because we worked with only 
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17 states, the lack of variation on the regulatory measures limits our ability to examine a 
broader scope of policies such as conversion and AWP-FOC laws. Future studies should 
identify datasets with information on more states to obtain greater variation on the entire 
spectrum of policies.  
It is also important to note that neither the Hausman-Taylor nor the random 
effects GLS procedure corrects for the bias as a result of reverse causality if we suspect 
that such bias indeed exists. In other words, hospitals might have endogenously selected 
themselves into different programs based on their level of uncompensated care. In such 
cases, a propensity score matching technique might prove useful. Intuitively, the 
propensity score matching constructs a control group from the group of untreated 
individuals and ensures that the control group is as similar as possible as the treatment 
group with respect to observable characteristics that affect both the outcome and the 
treatments. Matching has some important advantages over the Hausman-Tayor 
procedure. As a non-parametric method, matching does not impose any specific linearity 
assumptions on the evaluated effects that are inherent in regression-based modeling. 
Furthermore, matching explicitly tries to find for each untreated unit a similar treated unit 
to evaluate the counterfactual, i.e. what would happen to the treatment group without the 
treatment. If sample selection remains a concern, additional information on policy 
adoption needs to be collected. Unfortunately, these data were not available at the time of 
the study. However, since our unit of analysis is the individual hospital and the adoption 
of various regulations by the states might be influenced by the magnitude of the 
uncompensated care at the state level, such endogeneity problems might be mitigated. 
Another reason to believe that reverse causality will not significantly bias our results is 
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that policy adoptions are unlikely to be correlated with recent level of hospital 
uncompensated care provision. Most our states adopted these regulations several decades 
ago. Even if a state’s decision to adopt these policies was based on its level of 
uncompensated care, it is more likely to be determined by the aggregated level of 
uncompensated care then. In other words, regulations do not correlate with the level of 
uncompensated care during the same time periods. Nevertheless, future research needs to 
control for the first stage selection using data containing information that predicts 
adoption. 
Additional concern about endogeneity lies in the potential spillover effects. In 
other words, states with policies that encourage uncompensated care provision might 
attract the uninsured from adjacent states with less friendly polices to seek care from their 
hospitals. As information on patient origin for the self-pay/charity care patients is missing 
from our data, we are unable to examine the proportion of patients that are from a 
contiguous state with less generous uncompensated care policies. However, we do not 
expect that such a spillover, if it indeed exists, will significantly bias our results. The 
uninsured tend to seek care locally for three main reasons. First and foremost, they 
typically delay care until symptoms worsen to the point when they end up being admitted 
into an ER in a local hospital. Second, they lack the information about which hospitals 
provide charity care, not to mention which states have more uninsured-patients-friendly 
policies. Third, the uninsured might not be able to afford travelling to another state to 
seek care, given that they typically have very low income.   
Finally, we had access only to inpatient data, which limited our ability to analyze 
the regulatory effects on primary/preventive care. For example, if a particular bundle of 
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regulations (e.g., community benefit requirements and uncompensated care pools) 
encourages hospitals to provide primary/preventive care to the underserved population, 
we were not able to empirically test if the decrease in uncompensated care admissions is 
due to the effect of that incentive. Future research should focus on incorporating data on 
primary/preventive care to capture the intermediate effect of these regulations so that we 
are able to not only assess the full spectrum of the regulatory effects but also improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which each regulation or a bundle of regulations 
influences uncompensated care provision for the underinsured and uninsured populations.  
Future work should focus on obtaining more data on HMO penetration, percent of 
population over 65, and uninsurance rate so that there will be real changes over time for 
the HTIV method to yield robust instruments. Furthermore, model identification could 
also be improved by adopting the county based market measure. Using patient flows to 
define market has the potential for endogeneity bias when we investigate the effects of 
competition on hospital cost and outputs (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Since our market 
groups were constructed based on hospital admissions and the dependent variable is also 
admissions, it is likely that our market level variables are correlated with the random 
error term. Given that the HTIV procedure is sensitive to endogeniety, we should be able 
to obtain improved estimates with an exogenous county based market measure. Finally, 
we should further adjust admissions by case-mix to account for the intensity of resource 
use so that our measure could better reflect the actual hospital effort for uncompensated 
care. As suggested by some studies comparing adjusted and unadjusted utilization 
measures, case mix has significantly affected the level of hospital resource use (Weiner, 
Starfield et al. 1991; Berlowitz, Ash et al. 1998; Liu, Sales et al. 2003; Lee and Roh 
 119
2007). Future work should include in the empirical model a case mix severity measure 
from the discharge data using the ICD codes.  
In conclusion, despite the limitations, our study represents a comprehensive 
examination of competition (CON), subsidy (uncompensated care pool) and requirement 
(community benefit requirement) regulations that have the most influence on hospital 
uncompensated care provision. It overcomes the limits of previous research that focused 
primarily on the effect of a single regulation in a given state. The current study not only 
improves generalizability by examining hospitals in 17 U.S. states, it also investigates 
multiple policy interventions and their interactions, which are argued to be crucial in 
understanding the impact of the regulatory environment on hospitals provision of 
uncompensated care. In addition, the current study improves upon measures of 
uncompensated care using a more direct measure of the actual care delivered to the 
uninsured --- admissions for self-pay/charity patients. Findings from this study suggest 
that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals view and respond to policy incentives differently. 
In addition, regulatory interactions are found to significantly influence the 
uncompensated care provision by both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The study helps 
improve policy maker’s understanding of the impact of the regulatory environment on 
nonprofit and for-profit hospital behaviors and their uncompensated care provision. It 
contributes to the current debate over the new IRS ruling on community benefit reporting 
for tax exempt nonprofit hospitals.  
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APPENDIX A  
REGULATORY VARIATIONS  
 The following table presents study regulations for all 48 U.S. states.  
  
Table B.1: Hospital Regulations in 48 U.S. States (by 2007) 
 
 
States 
 
 
CON 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
REQUIREMENT 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
POOL 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
CONVERSION 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
AWP/FOC 
 
FOC 
Duration 
 
AWP 
Duration 
Alabama X 1979-          
Arizona*  1971-
1985 
  X 1992- X     
Arkansas† X 1975-   X    X 1995- 1995- 
California  1969-
1987 
X 1997- effective, passed 
in 1994 
X 1988- X     
Colorado*  1973-
1987 
  X 1983-The Reform 
Act for Provision 
of Care to the 
Medically Indigent 
X     
Connecticut X 1973- X 2001-  1991-1994 X     
Delaware X 1978-          
Florida* X 1973-    1984-1996      
Georgia X 1974-   X  X  X  1976- 
Idaho  1980-
1983 
X      X  1994- 
Illinois X 1974- X      X  1994- 
Indiana  1980-
1996, 
1997-
1999 
X 1994- reporting X HCI   X  1994- 
Iowa* X 1977-          
Kansas  1972-
1985 
         
Kentucky* X 1972-       
 
X  1994- 
Louisiana† X 1991-     X  X  1995- 
Maine* X 1978-          
Maryland* X 1968- X 2001- X 1974- X     
Massachusetts* X 1972- X 1994-voluntary X 1985-1988, 1989-
1991, 1992-1997, 
1998- 
     
Michigan X 1972-          
Minnesota  1971-
1985 
X         
Mississippi X 1979-       X  1984- 
Missouri X 1979- X 1994- Access        
Montana X 1975-         1991-1993 
Nebraska† X 1979-   X  X 1996-    
Nevada* X 1971- X 2005- X Property tax funded      
New Hampshire X 1979- X 2000- effective, passed 
in 1999 
  X     
New Jersey* X 1971-   X 1980-1993, 1993-      
New Mexico  1978-
1983 
  X    X 1979-  
New York* X 1966- X 1991- general X 1974-1997, 1997-      
 
                                                 
* Study state 
† Long-term care facility only 
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Appendix B: Continued 
States 
 
 
CON 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
REQUIREMENT 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
POOL 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
CONVERSION 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
AWP/FOC 
 
FOC 
Duration 
AWP 
Duration 
North Carolina* X 1978- X 2005-        
North Dakota  1971-
1995 
      X 1985-  
Ohio† X 1975-   X       
Oklahoma X 1971-   X    X 1996-  
Oregon†* X 1971-     X     
Pennsylvania  1979-
1996 
X 1997-mini X  
 
 
     
Rhode Island* X 1968- X 1999- effective, passed 
in 1997 
  X     
South Carolina X 1971-          
South Dakota  1972-
1988 
         
Tennessee X 1973-          
Texas  1975-
1985 
X 1993- mini     X 1975- 1992- 
Utah*  1979-
1984 
X         
Vermont X 1979- X         
Virginia X 1973-   X SLH 1946-1989, 
1989- 
  X  1983- 
Washington* X 1971-     X     
West Virginia* X 1977-   X Property tax funded      
Wisconsin†* X 1977-
1987, 
1993- 
      X 1975-  
Wyoming  1977-
1989 
      X  1990- 
Total 34  18  18  12  15   
 
                                                 
* Study state 
† Long-term care facility only  
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APPENDIX B  
MARKET DEFINITION 
To define markets by patient flow, we use the HCUP SID data to implement the 
following algorism18. We first determined patients’ origin by their zip code and the 
county/counties that correspond to that zip code. We then found the hospitals they 
attended and the county/counties that correspond to those hospitals. We defined markets 
as county/counties that sent at least 50 percent of its patients to another county. As a 
result, all counties that share the initial market were grouped.  
Counties that do not belong to any markets after the initial grouping were then 
added to the market groups if a county sent at least 21 percent of its patients to a county 
that is already in a market.  Counties that belong to multiple markets were then placed 
into the market to which it sent its largest number of patients greater than 21 percent. 
After all markets were defined, smaller markets were absorbed into larger markets if the 
combination of the markets was logical in terms of spatial proximity and patient flow.   
For example, Maryland has 24 counties with 22 counties that have hospitals in our 
sample19. In the first step, Allegany and Garrett were grouped in the same market since 
98 percent of Allegany patients were from Garrett.  Baltimore county and Baltimore city 
were put in the same market as 70 percent of Baltimore county patients were from 
Baltimore city. After the initial grouping, we have 12 market groups and three counties 
                                                 
 
 
18 We use counties as markets for Nevada, New York, and Rhode Island since either zip code or patient 
unique identifier/medical records are missing for these three states. For Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, 
West Virginia and Utah, we use the first three digits of patients’ zip codes to determine the county-to-
county patient flow table.  
19 Queen Anne’s and Caroline counties do not have hospitals in our sample, so we did not include those 
counties in our market groups.  
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(Talbot, Kent and Dochester) that were not assigned to any markets (as shown by the 
Figure 2). As Kent and Dochester sent most their patients (40 and 55 percent) to Talbot 
respectively, we grouped them in the same market. Baltimore county belongs to both 
Baltimore city market and Howard county market, and it sent its largest number of 
patients greater than 21 percent to its own Baltimore county market.  Baltimore city sent 
95 percent and Howard County sent 52 percent of their patients to Baltimore county. We 
therefore group Baltimore county and Baltimore city in the same market.  Smaller 
markets such as Somerset were absorbed into the larger Wicomico/ Worcester market 
because geographically Somerset borders both counties and it sent a significant number 
of patients (86 percent) to Wicmico and the remaining 14 percent to Worcester. Calvert 
was absorbed into the Prince George’s market and Howard/Carrol market was absorbed 
into Baltimore county/Baltimore city market for similar reasons. As a result of all the 
groupings, we ended up with 10 hospital market groups for Maryland.  
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APPENDIX C  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: MARKET DEFINED BY PATIENT 
FLOW VS. COUNTY 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to test if our results are sensitive to different 
market measures. Table C.1 defines each market measure. Table C.2 shows that mean 
market concentration is higher for the county based definition than the patient flow based 
market definition. Tables C.3-4 represents results from including different HHI measures 
in otherwise identical hospital uncompensated care admission regressions.  The 
parameter estimates for the regulatory variables are remarkably similar in sign although 
the level of significance differs slightly. The estimated effects were much lower in 
absolute value for variables such as CON, CON*POOL and all three variables interacted 
in the county model than that in the patient flow model, and the magnitude of 
uncompensated care pool variable is much higher in the county model. In addition, the 
parameter estimates on the HHI variables were largely similar in sign and magnitude, 
which is consistent with what Wong et al. (2005) find in their analysis. Their study shows 
that competition measures based on the geographic boundary definitions and the widely 
used patient flow definitions yielded the highest correlations with other measures and that 
empirical studies examining the impact of market competition on hospital costs or 
outputs are insensitive to the choice of hospital competition measure employed. Lastly, 
most control variables in both models have the similar signs and effect sizes.   
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Table C.1: Definition: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Variable Definition 
HHI_market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on patient flow 
HHI_county Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on county 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Summary Statistics for HHI by Sample and Definition 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HHI_county 295 4375.01 3154.32 534.05 10000 For-profit 
HHI_market 295 2571.69 2430.33 316.95 10000 
HHI_county 2235 5233.36 3425.55 513.36 10000 
Sample w/ 
Technology 
Intensity and 
ER 
Nonprofit 
HHI_market 2235 3176.62 2953.97 316.95 10000 
HHI_county 500 4099.15 3304.05 513.36 10000 For-profit 
HHI_market 500 2460.18 2433.56 316.95 10000 
HHI_county 2625 5091.12 3421.31 513.36 10000 
Sample w/o 
Technology 
Intensity and 
ER 
Nonprofit 
HHI_market 2625 3165.10 2930.38 316.95 10000 
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Table C.3: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 
(Patient Flows) 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON 10.73** 0.07** 3.95 0.25*** 
REQUIREMENT 9.71 -0.63*** -42.34*** 0.69*** 
POOL 51.55* 0.51* -131.97*** 1.14* 
CON*REQUIREMENT -1.91 0.02 - - 
CON*POOL 26.82*** 0.14*** 18.67*** 0.004 
POOL*REQUIREMENT 46.33 0.35 231.69*** -0.12 
CON*REQUIREMENT*
POOL 
-20.49*** -0.11 -19.57*** 0.03 
     
Technology Intensity 35.57 -0.26** 39.37 -0.36** 
ER 19.61 0.28 51.08 0.19 
Teaching hospital status 56.27 0.22 -28.81 -0.18 
Proportion with public 
owner 
-2383.43*** -7.35 -872.67 -1.66 
Hospital size 1.60*** -0.001 0.97*** -0.004*** 
Proportion 
network/system member 
-191.01 -2.79* -254.34 -6.12 
     
HHI -0.01 -0.00002 -0.01** 0.00003 
HMO penetration -214.63*** -1.68 -123.36 2.87 
Percentage of population 
65+ 
-11.23*** -0.06 0.25 -0.08 
Per capita income -2.27 -0.004 8.03** 0.06 
Percent uninsured 3.42 0.17 36.24*** 0.06 
Rural -0.56 0.02 -19.28 0.67 
2003 37.17** 0.07 34.40** 0.34 
2004 81.56*** 0.18 108.85*** 1.07 
Constant 123.27 3.78*** -578.55*** -2.48 
N 2235 295 
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Table C.4: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care Controlling 
for Technology Intensity and ER (County) 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions
CON 7.97 0.06** 1.77 0.22*** 
REQUIREMENT -14.96 -0.86*** -24.49* 0.77*** 
POOL 85.60** 0.40 34.93 1.80*** 
CON*REQUIREMENT 0.07 0.03 - - 
CON*POOL 23.91*** 0.14*** -1.99 -0.05 
POOL*REQUIREMENT -35.59 0.16 49.93 -1.09 
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL -15.46*** -0.10** -3.30 0.10* 
     
Technology Intensity 37.00 -0.27** 39.05 -0.38** 
ER 18.36 0.28 52.02 0.21 
Teaching hospital status 40.47 0.09 -33.88 -0.13 
Proportion with public owner -1447.31** -7.85 -370.30 -6.91 
Hospital size 1.56*** -0.001* 1.00*** -0.004*** 
Proportion network/system 
member 
-13.26 -1.21 -168.69*** -2.64 
     
HHI -0.01 -0.0001 0.01 0.0002*** 
HMO penetration -163.94* -1.96 -89.19 -0.50 
Percentage of population 65+ -1393.22*** -10.50 -445.78** -10.33*** 
Per capita income -3.26 -0.01 10.41*** 0.08 
Percent uninsured 6.58 0.18 26.35 0.02 
Rural 0.77 -0.004 -26.03 0.52 
2003 38.86* 0.06 32.57** 0.33 
2004 82.59*** 0.17 109.14** 1.07 
Constant 165.35 4.97 -548.45** -1.55 
N 2235 295 
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APPENDIX D  
THE RURAL/URBAN CONTINUUM CODES 
The Rural/Urban Continuum Codes are defined as follows: 
  
CODE  METROPOLITAN COUNTIES (1-3) 
01 Counties of metro areas of 1 million population or more 
02 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 - 1,000,000 population 
03 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 
 
  NONMETROPOLITAN COUNTIES (4-9) 
04 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 
05 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 
06 Urban population of 2,500-19,999, adjacent to a metro area 
07 Urban population of 2,500-19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 
08 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area 
09 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area 
 
99 Missing Value 
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APPENDIX E  
DISTRIBUTION OF HOSPITALS BY OWERSHIP TYPES 
 
 
Figure E.1: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2002 
 
 
 
Figure E.2: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2003 
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Figure E.3: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2004 
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APPENDIX F  
COMPARING SAMPLE WITH U.S. STATISTICS 
 
Table F.1: Two Sample t Test --- Nonprofit Hospitals 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Sample 5 0.2 0.0249 0.055678 0.130867 0.269133
U.S. 5 0.2 0.029326 0.065574 0.118579 0.281421
       
diff 5 2.98E-
09 
0.020736 0.046368 -0.05757 0.057574
mean(diff) = mean(var1 - var2)                               t =   0.0000 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =        4 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.5000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 1.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.5000 
 
Table F.2: Two Sample t Test --- For-profit Hospitals 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
var1 5 0.202 0.06127 0.137004 0.031888 0.372113
var2 5 0.2 0.047749 0.106771 0.067427 0.332573
       
diff 5 0.002 0.032465 0.072595 -0.08814 0.092138
       
mean(diff) = mean(var1 - var2)                               t =   0.0616  
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =        4  
       
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.5231         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9538          Pr(T > t) = 0.4769 
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APPENDIX G 
Table I.1: Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care by Type of Ownership 
(Pooled OLS) 
 Nonprofit For-profit 
Variables Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
Number of 
Admissions 
Percent of 
Admissions 
CON 4.939* 0.047* 6.58 0.33*** 
REQUIREMENT 2.295 -0.627** -29.71 0.44 
POOL 102.322*** 0.426 -162.14** 1.50* 
CON*REQUIREMENT -0.598 0.030 - - 
CON*POOL 27.864*** 0.212*** 23.59*** -0.06 
POOL*REQUIREMENT -4.547 0.655 246.09 -1.46 
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL -18.596*** -0.153*** -27.84** 0.09 
     
Teaching hospital status 114.729*** 0.102 -187.14*** -1.27** 
Proportion with public owner -1421.311*** 4.517 -2128.67*** -6.68 
Hospital size 1.904*** -0.002*** 1.83*** -0.005*** 
Proportion network/system 
member 
-316.237** -4.582*** -48.57 -0.42 
     
HHI -0.007 -0.0001 -0.03*** -0.0000003 
HMO penetration -293.959*** -2.148*** -105.19 5.97*** 
Percentage of population 65+ -7.761** -0.038 -0.32 -0.14*** 
Per capita income -4.156*** -0.021 7.79** 0.06 
Percent uninsured 9.870** 0.169*** 38.51*** -0.07 
Rural -3.997 0.058 -18.41 0.82*** 
2003 40.473* -0.042 41.01 0.38 
2004 84.793*** 0.205 106.42*** 1.08** 
Constant 144.676 4.127*** -566.86*** -2.00 
N 2322 295 
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